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COMMENT 
SMOKE BEFORE OIL: 
MODELING A SUIT AGAINST 
THE AUTO AND OIL INDUSTRY 
ON THE TOBACCO TORT 
LITIGATION IS FEASIBLE 
"If we can send humans to the moon and store encyclopedias' 
worth of information on something the size of a coin, why 
aren't we driving fuel-efficient vehicles that don't pollute?'" 
INTRODUCTION 
The petroleum industry (hereinafter "petro industry"), 
from start to finish, pollutes the environment: Oil production 
facilities spill and leak toxic chemicals, transport operations 
have frequent accidents, and refineries discharge large 
amounts of toxic by-products." Underground storage tanks leak 
'Elizabeth Grossman, Moral Exhaustion, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2000, Book 
World, at X06. 
2 In this Comment, "petro industry" means manufacturers, distributors, and 
producers of automobile fuel, diesel fuel, aircraft fuel, kerosene, and similar consumer 
products and the machines which use them. 
• Oil refineries are the largest stationary source of volatile organic compounds 
("vOCs") in the U.S. MINORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T REFORM, 105TH 
CONG., OIL REFINERIES FAIL TO REPORT MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF HARMFUL EMISSIONS i 
(Comm. Print 1999). They are the "fourth largest industrial source of toxic emissions 
and the single largest source of benzene pollution". [d. Their unreported leaks are the 
nth largest source ofVOC emissions in the US, controlling this illegal pollution could 
be done at minimal cost, and doing so would be the equivalent of removing 5 million 
automobiles from the road. [d. at ii. Further, almost half of refmeries in America are 
429 
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gasoline constituents into the soil and drinking water supplies.' 
Automobiles emit pollutants. These emissions are causing 
health harms, smog, climate change, and a hole in the earth's 
ozone.5 Petroleum dependence is increasing the need for high-
ways, which diminishes wildlife corridors. 6 These are just a few 
of the international social and environmental harms associated 
with the industry.7 The petro industry, comprising oil compa-
located in "unattainment" areas -areas that fail to meet federal and state air pollution 
standards. Id. at 6. In 1995, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA's") 
"Regulatory Impact Assessment for Petroleum Refineries" concluded that 4.5 million 
people living within 30 miles of oil refineries are exposed to benzene concentrations in 
excess of the Clean Air Act's acceptable risk threshold. CENTER FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE TECHNOLOGIES, CRUDE RECKONING: THE IMPACT OF 
PETROLEUM ON CALIFORNIA'S PuBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT 32 (2000). The 
American Petroleum Institute in 1994 concluded that 85% of all refineries in the U.S. 
are the source of known groundwater contamination. Id. at 33. Oceans annually build 
up approximately 1.47 million tons of oil from oil refinery discharges and transport 
efforts according to a 2002 report by Harvard. Id. 
• Approximately 38% of the 920,000 underground storage tanks ("USTs") in the 
U.S. are leaking gasoline and its constituents in every part of the country. Small, Mat-
thew, C., Should MTBE be Banned or Limited to 3% by Volume in Gasoline? Mineral 
Engineering, U.C. Berkley, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency at 
http://petroleum.berkeley.edu/patzek/studentslsmall-research.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2005). Many scientists believe that one of the chemicals in these products 
cannot even be contained in USTs: Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE"), a known 
cause of leukemia in humans. Gregory Crofton, Geology experts believe MTBE cleanup 
is adding to problem, Tahoe Daily Tribune, March 17, 2003, available at 
http://www.tahoedailytribune.comlapps/p bcs.dlVarticle?Date=20030317 &Category=NE 
WS&ArtNo=303170106&Ref=AR (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); COMMUNITIES FOR A 
BETTER ENVIRONMENT, CBE RESOLVES LAWSUIT AGAINST HALF OF CALIFORNIA OIL 
COMPANIES TO REQUIRE CLEAN-UP OF MTBE (Aug. 20 2001), at 
http://www.cbecal.org/alerts/oil/oMTBE082001.shtml(lastvisitedFeb.2.2005).In 
2002, a jury labeled MTBE as a defective product and found three companies in South 
Lake Tahoe poisoned water supplies with MTBE, making thirty-four drinking wells 
unusable. Seem Mehta, 3 Companies Liable in Tahoe MTBE Pollution, L. A. TIMES, 
April 17, 2002, at B7. In Santa Monica, California by the time MTBE was discovered 
in the city's drinking water wells 80% of the supply had been poisoned. Dan Morain, 
California and the West; Boxer Will Ask EPA to Curb Gas Additive, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
1997, at 3. 
• The U.S. Department of Energy reports approximately 25 pounds of green-
house gases are emitted per gallon of gas. Available at 
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txtlptb0512c.html, (last visited Aug. 22, 2002); Electronic 
comm. with U.S. Department of Energy fuel economy department, 
fueleconomy@ornl.gov (Aug. 22, 2003). In 2001, petroleum run engines in the U.S. 
consumed 799,134,000 gallons of oil per day. Id. Thus, in 2001 in the U.S. the total 
greenhouse gases produced by driving petroleum run vehicles was 19.978 billion tons 
per day. 
6 See, e.g., Katherine Shaver, Md. Alters Plan For Connector to Reduce Impacts; 
2 Latest Opinions Presented as Being Less Disruptive, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2003, Metro 
at B07. 
7 See infra, notes 53-100. See also, State of Denial, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 
27,2001, available at http://www.sacbee.comldenial (last visited on Feb. 6, 2005). 
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nies, refmeries, engine manufacturers, vehicle manufacturers, 
and the purveyors of related products and devices, makes and 
markets products that release toxic chemicals not just at the 
tailpipe or smokestack, but at every step in the production-to-
consumption process. 8 The petro industry might be the largest 
source of pollution on the planet, and yet it is unnecessary. 
The successful legal movement in the 1990's against the 
tobacco industry demonstrated that common-law torts can be 
used effectively against manufacturers of widely disseminated 
harmful products in order recover private and public expendi-
tures.9 The principles learned from the tobacco litigation may 
be used to recoup private and public expenditures from the 
petro industry for harm caused by use of their products. Six 
years before 46 state attorneys general settled with the na-
tion's four major tobacco companies for $206 billion, one com-
mentator poignantly noted: "in an era of comparative fault, it 
must be regarded as a remarkable feat that an industry 
claimed to be responsible for the highest toll of premature 
death in human history could withstand almost four decades of 
litigation without paying a single adverse monetary award.»!o 
Shortly thereafter, on the heels of two waves of lawsuits 
against the tobacco industry, a state-led wave of tobacco litiga-
tion occurred nationwide. 11 
Likewise, the petro industry has managed to pass billions 
of dollars in environmental costs to the public, while success-
fully avoiding common-law tort liability. The net income of the 
major U.S. petroleum companies from 1990 to 2001 was $318.2 
billion, not including the mining, manufacturing, and trade 
8 The U.S. EPA defines toxic substances as "chemicals or compounds that may 
present an unreasonable threat to human health and the environment. Human expo· 
sure to toxic substances can cause a variety of health effects, including damage to the 
nervous system, reproductive and developmental problems, cancer, and genetic disor-
ders." at http://www.epa.gov/ebtpageslpolltoxicsubstances.html (last visited Feb. 2, 
2005). 
9 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
CASE CITATION (No. 97AS03031), and State of Alaska v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.1 
JU-97915 CL, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edultohaccollitigation/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2005). 
10 ELIZABETH G. Hn..L, WHAT WILL IT MEAN FOR CALIFORNIA? THE TOBACCO 
SETTLEMENT 2-3 (1999); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Liti-
gation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 878 (1992). 
11 Erin Myers, The Ward, Kershaw and Minton Environmental Symposium: 'Up 
in Smoke: Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Tobacco,' 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 
79, 80 (1998). 
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petroleum corporations. 12 In 1997, Americans paid $4 billion, or 
$.05 per gallon of gasoline, in additional costs due to ozone-
related respiratory health problems, and up to tens of billions 
of dollars, or $.59 per gallon of diesel, in additional costs due to 
increased morbidity and premature mortality caused by par-
ticulates and acidic aerosols. 13 
This Comment explores the viability of using the same le-
gal theories employed in the 1990's tobacco litigation to hold 
the petro industry accountable in California for some of the 
harms caused by its products. Section I reviews the historical 
framework and key events leading to the tobacco tort litiga-
tion's recovery of public expenses and attainment of industry 
accountability. Section II describes some of the damages that 
petro plaintiffs could allege in similar tort claims brought 
against the petro industry and identifies public costs that petro 
plaintiffs might be able to recover. In Section III the feasibility 
of bringing petro tort claims in California against manufactur-
ers of internal combustion engines (hereinafter "ICE") and pe-
troleum fuel is explored. This Section analyzes the ability of 
petro plaintiffs to establish standing and whether any federal 
laws preempt their claims. This Section concludes that petro 
plaintiffs could establish standing to bring either a products 
liability or nuisance suit, and that their claims could survive 
preemption challenges. This Section then explores the applica-
bility of products liability law to petro pollution. In particular, 
the element of causation is considered and found to be provable 
under California law. The California tests for defective design 
are also considered, including which test is appropriate for 
petro litigation. This Section proposes that a strict liability 
defective design claim against petroleum fuel and ICE manu-
facturers could be successful. Lastly, Section III explores the 
applicability of public nuisance law to petro pollution. This 
12 u.s. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002, Doc. No. 
891, at http://www.census.gov/prodl2003pubsl02statab/energy.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2005). 
13 JOHN L. MOORE ET AL., OIL IMPORTS: AN OVERVIEW AND UPDATE OF ECONOMIC 
AND SECURITY EFFECTS, C.R.S. REP. 98-1, E.N.R. at Table A-I (1997), available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreportslenergy/eng-
53.cfm?&CFID=6471470&CFTOKEN=24377660 (last visited Feb. 2, 2005); See also 
STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY: 
VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 2 (1995) (stating health 
benefits of reducing urban ozone concentrations, now estimated to cost $0.5 billion to 
$4 billion per year). 
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Section proposes that suits by both the California Attorney 
General and private litigants alleging public nuisance against 
petroleum fuel and ICE manufacturers and seeking to abate 
health and environmental harms could obtain injunctive and 
civil penalty relief. 
I. BACKGROUND -- HISTORY OF THE TOBACCO TORT 
LITIGATION 
The day after a California law shielding the tobacco indus-
try from liability expired in 1997, California's Attorney General 
filed suit against the American "tobacco industry."" Until that 
point, the industry had successfully staved off lawsuits through 
legal and non-legal defense tactics even in states without laws 
exempting tobacco products from products liability. 15 The to-
bacco industry's main strategy was never to settle, while fight-
ing back with its high-powered lawyers and inexhaustible fi-
nancial resources. 16 Plaintiff smokers, as a result, commonly 
lost due to financial bankruptcy.17 After the adoption of com-
ment i of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, some courts opined 
that its language exempted tobacco from products liability. IS 
Some tobacco defendants successfully argued that no safer al-
I. The courts in both Naegele v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d 769, 770-771 
(Cal. 2002), and Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 50 P.3d 751, 753 (Cal. 2002), 
held that CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45 shielded tobacco companies for a 10-year period 
from 1987 until 1997, when the legislature amended it so the government could sue on 
tobacco-related claims. California's suit, filed after the expiration of this statute, Cali-
fornia v. Philip Morris, Inc., Case No. 97AS03031, is available at 
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobaccollitigation/ca/ (last visited on Feb. 8, 2005). The 
"tobacco industry" refers to the seven major tobacco companies involved in the 1998 
settlement. Office of Attorney General, State of California, at 
http://caag.state.ca.us/tobacco/index.htm (last visited on Feb. 8, 2005). 
15 See Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 868. 
16 Id. at 867-74; Rodney R. Moy, Review of Selected 1997 California Legislation: 
Tobacco Companies, Immune No More-California's Removal of the Legal Barriers Pre-
venting Plaintiffs from Recovering for Tobacco-Related Illness, 29 McGeorge L. Rev. 
761, 764 (1998). 
17 Id. at 867-74; Rodney R. Moy, supra note 16. 
IS RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i., states that regarding strict 
liability for defective products, "[tlhe article sold must be dangerous to an extent be-
yond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, 
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics ... 
Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may 
be harmful. .. " See also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 487 
(3d. Cir. 1965) (Freedman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 382 U.s. 987 (1966). (Pritchard 
II). See also Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 863. 
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ternative design existed and causation was unproven. 19 Before 
juries, however, the defense's most powerful argument was al-
ways assumption of risk. Smokers assumed the risk by volun-
tarily choosing to smoke, and suing for self-imposed harm 
lacked moral character!O The strength of the assumption-of-
risk defense defeated common-law theories of liability against 
the tobacco industry since the Surgeon General's Report in 
1964 first concluded that cigarette smoking is an immediate 
health hazard. 21 
Early in the 1990's, tobacco plaintiffs obtained the "smok-
ing gun." Confidential industry files anonymously sent to a 
San Diego law professor, and discovery documents obtained by 
plaintiff's attorneys in Cipollone v. Liggett Group. Inc., pro-
vided evidence of "the tobacco industry's calculated and suc-
cessful efforts [since] the 1930's to confuse the American public 
and their doctors about the dangers of cigarette smoking.''''2 
After not settling a claim in 35 years, the tobacco industry be-
gan settling and losing lawsuits. 23 Tobacco plaintiffs finally 
could prove that tobacco products were defective products 
without the industry successfully defending on the basis of as-
sumption of risk, lack of causation, or lack of awareness'" 
The "smoking gun" documents showed the tobacco indus-
try purposely and secretly increased the addictive nature of 
their products and targeted youth to create a lifetime of addic-
tion:· In fact, long before the first warnings of the lethal dan-
19 See Kotler v. Am. Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225(1st Cir. 1990), petition for 
cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3014 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1991) (No. 90-1473); Semowich v. R.J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., No. 86-CV-118, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9102, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 
18,1988). 
20 Richard L. Cupp, Jr. A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud 
and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 465, 466-
67 (1998); See also Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 871. 
21 See Report 19890100, RJ Reynolds archives, at 
http://www.rjrtdocs.comlrjtdocslsummary_displaywmt?z=l&search=O&stab=summary 
(last visited on Oct. 23, 2004). 
22 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminat-
ing Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Rey-
nolds archives, Published Document 19880326); see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 
U.S. 504 (1992). 
23 Robert L. Rabin, supra note 10, at 874; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at 
465-467. 
24 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at 48l. 
25 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminat-
ing Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Rey-
nolds archives, Published Document 19880326.) 
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gers of smoking appeared, the industry knew of the dangers 
but failed to test their products or warn consumers.26 Moreover, 
the industry could have designed their cigarettes to be less le-
thal, but refused to do SO.27 A "public relations smokescreen" 
was designed to deceive consumers and give the appearance 
that the industry was "testing and improving the safety of their 
products."26 Furthermore, the industry actively conspired to 
stifle public awareness about relevant scientific developments.29 
In one instance, a press release from a July 1962 circulation by 
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee announced that a 
scientist had given "28 reasons for his belief that the causal 
relationship of cigarette smoking to lung cancer is certainly 
unproved."·D The industry sent this press release not only to 
members of Congress, but also to American doctors."! A confi-
dential memo between lawyers of a prominent tobacco-defense 
law firm warned that "the introduction of the purportedly 
'safer' cigarette 'could immediately and significantly increase 
<tobacco companies) exposure to liability for sales of conven-
tional cigarettes.',,"2 Evidence from tobacco suits against Mor-
ris, Liggett, and Lorillard showed all three defendants either 
made safer cigarettes or made substantial progress toward 
their development as early as the 1960s, but chose not to sell 
them."' The new evidence spurred State Attorneys General na-
tionwide to bring suit against the tobacco industry."' They used 
the same tort claims alleged for decades in unsuccessful to-
bacco litigation, such as negligent and intentional misrepresen-
tation, products liability for defective design and failure to 
warn, and nuisance theories. 
In People of the State of California v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
California's Attorney General alleged that the defendant to-







32 Ed Bean, Memo Warns of Legal Risk of 'Smokeless' Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 13, 1988. 
33 Id. 
34 Supplement to Press Release, Tobacco Products Liability Project, Incriminat-
ing Cigarette Documents Released (Mar. 26, 1988) (on file with author). (from RJ Rey-
nolds archives, Published Document 19880326.) 
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products, knowing that they would be used without inspection 
for defect, which have caused injury to human beings, includ-
ing many who were and are California Medi-Cal beneficiaries . 
. . [their] products were defectively designed because their 
products failed to perform as safely as an ordinary smoker or 
user would expect when used in the intended or reasonably 
foreseeable manner.'>35 The hidden addictive nature of their 
products could now be established from the industry's own 
statements, preventing the factfinder from concluding the 
smokers foresaw and assumed the risk.36 The industry actually 
manipulated their product's design by increasing nicotine lev-
els, thereby decreasing smokers' ability to control their expo-
sure to the risk of harm. 37 The claim asserted the tobacco prod-
ucts were "[d]efectively designed because they contained exces-
sive preventable dangers ... [and] the Defendant Tobacco Com-
panies failed to redesign their products to reduce this health 
risk, and in fact, frequently took steps to increase or enhance 
this risk."36 This allegation was supported by evidence showing 
cigarette manufacturers failed to warn consumers of the addic-
tive power of tobacco and politically opposed all efforts to in-
clude this warning on federally mandated labels.39 California 
alleged that the products' design injured thousands of Califor-
nia consumers!O These injuries include addiction, lung cancer, 
throat cancer, emphysema, heart disease, birth defects, and 
death." The State concluded that it had a right to recover its 
expenses under California's Welfare & Institutions Code since 
the defendants' defective products directly and proximately 
35 First Amended Complaint at 14, California v. Philip Morris, Inc. CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031). 
36 Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions & Answers About Tobacco 
Liability, 1-2 (on me with author) (explaining that since 60 to 90% of smokers are ad-
dicted and/or dependent on nicotine and most smokers have made attempts to break 
their addiction but find themselves unable to stop and nicotine is more addictive than 
heroin and far more available, and it is still socially accepted and highly promoted). 
37 See id. 
38 First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031). 
39 See Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions & Answers About To-
bacco Liability, 2 (on file with author). 
'" First Amended Complaint at 15, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031). 
41 [d. 
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injured California Medi-Cal beneficiaries!2 The State also al-
leged punitive damages were warranted based on the indus-
try's moral depravity.'" 
In a second cause of action, California alleged that since 
1953, the tobacco companies conspired and agreed to unrea-
sonably restrain the market for cigarettes and other tobacco 
products in violation of the Cartwright Act, by limiting and 
suppressing research and information that could have led to 
product innovations.... This prevented the making of a safer 
cigarette available to the consuming public and allowing other 
manufacturers to lawfully compete in the market!5 The depri-
vation of the choice to buy a safer cigarette product buttressed 
the claim for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses. It lowered 
the degree of fault attributable to smokers for failing to choose 
to buy less-harmful products. California joined its claim with 
claims from 39 other states!6 While different states used 
slightly different theories of liability, all included claims, like 
California's, for Medicare reimbursement based on tort liabil-
ity." The defendant manufacturers that had escaped paying a 
cent for 35 years agreed to a $246 billion settlement!8 Thus it 
42 Medi-Cal is a public medical care program funded 50:50 by the state and fed-
eral government. California, as the other states, was suing for its share. "When bene-
fits are provided or will be provided to a beneficiary under this chapter because of an 
injury for which another person is liable, ... the director [of the Department of Health 
Services] shall have a right to recover from such person or carrier the reasonable value 
of benefits so provided." CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 14124.71(a) (West 2001). 
43 First Amended Complaint at 23, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031). The state was able to allege this because the majority of 
smokers (80 to 90%) "began smoking and became addicted to nicotine as teenagers, 
before the age of adult responsibility," and "addiction diminishes a person's ability to 
choose freely and act wisely." Tobacco Products Liability Project, Ten Questions & 
Answers About Tobacco Liability, 2 (on me with author). 
44 First Amended Complaint at 17, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031); See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 
1997). 
45 First Amended Complaint at 17, California v. Philip Morris, Inc., CASE 
CITATION (No. 97AS03031); See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16720 (West 
1997). 
46 Details of this nationwide lawsuit, including the resulting master settlement, 
are available at http://www.library.ucsf.edultobacco/litigation/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2005). 
47 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., supra note 20, at 468. 
45 California's $14 billion share of the settlement is being used towards redress-
ing the harms caused by industry practice that aggressively marketed defective prod-
ucts with disregard for their effects. 
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was a case in which every defendant implicitly acknowledged 
its potential liability. 
Applicability of the same legal theories against other in-
dustries has not gone unnoticed. 49 As many commentators have 
noted, "the tobacco litigation is a touchstone of tort law's ex-
panding social and public policy role. "50 Such lawsuits are ac-
complishing in court what could not be achieved in the state 
and federal legislative branches.51 Moreover, the explosion of 
the anti-tobacco action demonstrates the effectiveness of the 
movement.52 
The nexus for the next lawsuit could be the petro industry. 
For instance, for over fifty years scientists and politicians have 
known about the health and environmental harms caused by 
use of gasoline, diesel fuel and related petrochemical products 
(collectively "petroleum products"), yet their sale continues 
without legal challenge. Petro industry products cause harm 
that arguably dwarfs the harm caused by tobacco industry 
products. A lawsuit against the petro industry to recover 
medical reimbursement costs and environmental response 
costs could bring the biggest settlement of all time. 
II. DISCUSSION -- DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE USE OF PETRO 
PRODUCTS 
Significant evidence exists that petro products are causing 
substantial health costs, public costs, and environmental 
4. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., "Beyond Tobacco Symposium: Tort Issues in Light of the 
Cigarette Litigation: State Medical Reimbursement Lawsuits After Tobacco: Is the 
Domino Effect for Lead Paint Manufacturers and Others Fair Game?" 27 Pepp. L. Rev. 
685 (2000). 
00 Michael L. Rustad, Srrwke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega 
Social Policy Cases. 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 511-512 (2001); See also Edward Winter 
Trapolin, Sued Into Submission: Judicial Creation of Standards in the Manufacture 
and Distribution of Lawful Products-The New Orleans Lawsuit Against Gun Manu-
facturers, 46 Loy. L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (Winter, 2000). 
" See generally MaviIia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass. 1983); 
Martin v. Harrington and Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1216 (N.D. Tex. 1985); see also 
Lawrence Reed, Taxation by Litigation" Threatens Every American Business . . . In-
cluding Banks!, MICH. BANKER, June 1, 1999, at 84,; Dahleen Glanton, NRA, Firearms 
Industry Work to Fight Cities' Suits, Cill. TruB., Feb. 4,1999, at 5. 
52 See Report 19890100, RJ Reynolds archives, available at 
http://www.rjrtdocs.comlrjtdocsisummary_displaywmt?z=1&search=0&stab=summary 
(last visited on Oct. 23, 2004). 
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costs.53 Actual details concerning the practices and knowledge 
of petro defendants regarding these harms would likely require 
corporate research and discovery. However, the following 
summary indicates that the kinds and breadth of damages 
petro plaintiffs can claim may exceed those of tobacco tort 
plaintiffs. 
A PuBLIC HEALTH HARMs 
The health of American citizens is significantly harmed by 
the major constituents of automobile exhaust, which have been 
identified since 1922.54 In 1957, some members of Congress 
were so concerned about the health effects of vehicle pollution 
that a bill was introduced (although ultimately not passed) to 
prohibit from U.S. roadways any motor vehicle that discharged 
pollution in excess of levels found dangerous by the U.S. Sur-
geon General.65 Today, it is common knowledge that human 
exposure to petroleum emissions trapped in a garage causes 
death. Less known is that exposure to these emissions trapped 
within the earth's atmospheric layers is causing not only early 
death,sa but also cancer,s7 respiratory illness/s heart and blood 
53 See infra notes 54-100 and accompanying text . 
.. JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 20 (2000) . 
.. JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 23 (2000) . 
.. D.W. Dockery, C.A. Pope III, Acute Respiratory Effects of Particulate Air Pollu-
tion, 15 Annual Review of Public Health 107 (1994), K. Katsouyanni, G. Touloumi, C. 
Spix, et al., Short-term Effects of Ambient Sulphur Dioxide and Particulate Matter on 
Mortality in 12 European Cities: Results from Times Series Data from the APHEA Pro-
ject: Air Pollution and Health: a European Approach. 314 BMJ 1658 (1997), J.M. 
Samet, F. Dominici, F.C. Curriero, I. Coursac, S.L. Zeger, Fine Particulate Air Pollution 
and Mortality in 20 U.S. Cities, 1987-1994, 343(23) N. Engi. J. Med. 1742 (2000), 
Schwartz J, Air Pollution and Daily Mortality: A Review and Meta Analysis, 64(1) 
Environ. Res. 36 (1994), D.W. Dockery, C.A. Pope III, X. Xu et aI., An Association Be-
tween Air Pollution and Mortality in Six US Cities, 329 N. Engi. J. Med. 1753 (1993), 
C.A. Pope III, M.J. Thun, M.M. Namboodiri et aI., Particulate Air Pollution as a Predic-
tor of Mortality in a Prospective Study of US Adults, 151 Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 
669 (1995), D. Krewski, R. Burnett, M.S. Goldberg et al., Reanalysis of the Harvard Six 
Cities Study and the American Cancer Society Study of Particulate Air Pollution and 
Mortality: Health Effects Institute Special Report, Boston: Health Effects Institute 
(2000), C.A. Pope III, R.T. Burnett, M.J. Thun et al., Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary 
Mortality, and Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 JAMA 1132 
(2002). 
57 Agencies listing gasoline and diesel exhaust as carcinogens: The list of "chemi-
cals known to the State of California to cause cancer" can be found at: 
http://www.oehha.c a.gov/prop65/prop65_listlNewlist.html; Studies finding diesel ex-
haust causes cancer: California EPA 1998. Proposed Identification of Diesel Exhaust as 
a Toxic Air Contaminant. Part B: Health Risk Assessment for Diesel Exhaust. Califor-
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problems,59 reproduction and fetal problems/o and nervous sys-
nia Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Health Hazard As-
sessment, Air Toxicology and Epidemiology Section, May 1998; Bhatia R, Lopipero P, 
Smith AH., Diesel Exhaust Exposure and Lung Cancer. Epidemiology 9(1):84-91 (1998). 
Studies finding benzene causes leukemia: Rinsky, RA; Smith, AB; Horning, R; et aI., 
Benzene and Leukemia: An Epidemiologic Risk Assessment. N Engl J Med 316:1044-
1050 (1987). Study linking butadiene and leukemia: Delzell E; Sathiakumar N; Hov-
inga M., A follow·up study of synthetic rubber workers, Toxicology 113:182-189 (1996). 
Other VOCs that cause cancer: Brief summaries of scientific data on many of the com-
pounds in fuels and exhaust have been prepared by the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency and are available on-line from the Integrated Risk Information 
System (IRIS): http://www.epa.gov/iriS/index.html . 
.. Hospitalization for respiratory causes: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Air Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter, Vol. 3. Publication No. PB96-
168257EPAl600/P-95/001CF (1996). Effect of Motor Vehicle Emissions on Respiratory 
Health in an Urban Area. Environ. Health Perspect. 110(3):293-300; Detels R, et al., 
The UCLA Population Studies of CORD: X. A Cohort Study of Changes in Respiratory 
Function Associated With Chronic Exposure to SOX, NOx, and Hydrocarbons. Am J 
Public Health 81:350-359 (1991). Pulmonary growth in children: Gauderman WJ, et al., 
Association between air pollution and lung function growth in southern California 
children: results from a second cohort, Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 166(1):76-84 9 
(2002); Horak F. Jr., et al., Particulate Matter and Lung Function Growth in Children: 
A 3-yr Follow-Up Study in Austrian Schoolchildren. Eur. Respir. J. 19(5):838-45 (2002). 
Asthma: Koenig JQ., Air Pollution and Asthma, J Allergy Clin. Immunoi. 104(4 Pt 
1):717 -22 (1999); McConnell R, et ai. Air Pollution and Bronchitic Symptoms in South· 
ern California Children with Asthma, Environ. Health Perspect. 107:757-760 (1999); 
Delfino RJ., Epidemiologic Evidence for Asthma and Exposure to Air Toxics: Linkages 
Between Occupational, Indoor, and Community Air Pollution Research. Environ. 
Health Perspect. 110 Suppl 4:573-89 (2002); McConnell R, Berhane K, et al., Asthma in 
Exercising Children Exposed to Ozone: A Cohort Study. Lancet 359(9304):386-91 
(2002); Brauer M, et al., Air Pollution from Traffic and the Development of Respiratory 
Infections and Asthmatic and Allergic Symptoms in Children. Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care 
Med 166(8):1092-8 (2002). Other ozone effects: Gilliland FD, et al., The effects of ambi· 
ent air pollution on school absenteeism due to respiratory illnesses, Epidemiology. 
Jan;12(1):43-54 (2001); Balmes JR, et aI., Effects of ozone on normal and potentially 
sensitive human subjects. Part I: Airway inflammation and responsiveness to ozone in 
normal and asthmatic subjects. Res. Rep. Health Eff. Inst 78:1-37 (1997); White MC, 
Etzel RA, Wilcox WD, Lloyd C., Exacerbations of childhood asthma and ozone pollution 
in Atlanta, Environ, Res. 1994;65:56-68; Norris G, et al., An association between fine 
particles and asthma emergency department visits for children in Seattle. Environ. 
Health Perspect. 107(6):489-93 (1999); Friedman M.S., et aI., Impact of changes in 
transportation and commuting behaviors during the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in 
Atlanta on air quality and childhood asthma. JAMA285(7):897-905 (2001). 
50 Dockery DW., Epidemiologic evidence of cardiovascular effects of particulate 
air pollution, Environ. Health Perspect. 109 Suppl 4:483-486 (2001); Schwartz J., Air 
pollution and hospital admissions for heart disease in eight U.S. counties, Epidemiology 
10(1):17-22 (1999); Burnett R.T., Smith-Doiron M., Stieb D., Cakmak S., Brook J.R., 
Effects of particulate and gaseous air pollution on cardiorespiratory hospitalizations, 
Arch Environ Health 54:130-139 (1999); Mann J.K., Tager LB., Lurmann F. et al., Air 
pollution and hospital admissions for ischemic heart disease in persons with congestive 
heart failure or arrhythmia, Environ. Health Perspect. 110(12):1247-52 (2002); Linn 
WS, Szlachcic Y, Gong H Jr, Kinney PL, Berhane K.T., Air pollution and daily hospital 
admissions in metropolitan, Los Angeles Environ. Health Perspect. 108(5):427-434 
(2000). 
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tern toxicity.6l In 1990, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency declared "over half the cancer incidence is 
caused by air pollution coming from cars."6' Babies and chil-
dren are most at risk due to physiological vulnerabilities, such 
as greater relative exposure, less developed metabolism, and 
higher rates of cell production, growth, and change.63 Further-
more, there are social vulnerabilities such as poverty, malnu-
trition, and environmental injustice." 
American auto manufacturers and oil industries have his-
torically favored profits over protecting public and environ-
mental health. The Big Three automobile manufacturers once 
claimed that the auto industry would be ruined by the added 
expense if required to install seatbelts and air bags."· Begin-
ning in the 1930s, National City Lines, a company backed by 
General Motors, Standard Oil, Philips Petroleum, Firestone 
Tires and Rubber, Mack Truck, and other interests, systemati-
cally bought up and closed down more than 100 electric trolley 
lines in 45 cities across the country.66 In 1949, a federal grand 
jury indicted GM and the other companies of conspiring to re-
place electric transportation systems with buses and to mo-
nopolize the sale of buses."7 In 1969, the Justice Department 
60 Ritz B, Yu F., The effect of ambient carbon monoxick on low birth weight 
among children born in southern California between 1989 and 1993, Environ. Health 
Perspect. 107:17-25 (1999); Woodruff TJ, Grillo J, Schoendorf KC., The Relationship 
Between Selected Causes of PostneonatalInfant Mortality and Particulate Air Pollution 
in the United States, Environ. Health Perspect. 105:608-612 (1997); Ritz B, Yu F, 
Chapa G, Fruin S., Effect of air pollution on pre term birth among children born in 
Southern California between 1989 and 1993. Epidemiology 11(5):502-511 (2000); Ritz 
B, Yu F, Fruin S, Chapa G, Shaw GM, Harris JA., Ambient air pollution and risk of 
birth defects in Southern California, Am. J. Epidemiol. 155(1):17-25 (2002). 
61 Neurotoxicity of gasoline, air pollution or specific compounds: Ostro B., Lead: 
evaluation of current California air quality standards with respect to protection of 
children. (2000) (Rep. prepared for the California Air Resources Board and California 
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment at 
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/air/criteria_pollutantslAQAC2.html); Burbacher TM., Neuro-
toxic effects of gasoline and gasoline constituents, Environ. Health Perspect. 101 Suppl 
6:133-41 (1993). 
62 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FORA RIDE, 236 (2000). 
63 Joy E. Carlson, Children's Environmental Health Research - an Introduction, 
Environ. Health Perspect. 106, Supplement 3 (June 1998), at 
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/docsl1998/Suppl-3/intro1.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
54 Id. Along the same lines, though less documented, wildlife are likely suffering 
similar impacts from exposure to petro emissions . 
D1. 
.. Paul C. Judge, Selling Autos by Selling Safety, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1990, at 
66 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 236 (2000). 
67 JACK DOYLE, TAKEN FOR A RIDE, 236 (2000). 
13
Lipanovich: Smoke Before Oil
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
442 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VoL 35 
charged the Automobile Manufacturers Association, along with 
American Motors, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, with 
conspiring to prevent and delay the manufacture and use of 
pollution-control devices for automobiles.68 
The concentration of petroleum fuel by-products from 
automotive combustion is responsible for as much as fifty per-
cent of ozone in urban areas and is one of the country's largest 
sources of greenhouse gases that cause global warming."" 
Claiming that global warming is unproven, the petro industry 
has engaged in a disinformation campaign similar to the to-
bacco industry's. 70 It spent millions of dollars funding the 
Global Climate Coalition ("GCC") to convince the public global 
warming is not a threat and to lobby Congress against partici-
pation in the Kyoto ProtocoL 71 This mimics the deceptive 
claims made for years by the tobacco industry.72 Further, all 
the major automobile manufacturers have developed more fuel-
efficient vehicles, and the oil industry--more so than any other 
industry--is in the position to take the lead in hydrogen fuel 
production when oil runs out. Yet both industries, automobile 
and oil, have decided to make less harmful products available 
only to an extremely limited, if not practically unavailable, 
market.73 For example, a waiting list for the Toyota Prius (a 
hybrid vehicle that gets about 60 miles to the gallon) currently 
exists, and only recently was the vehicle even placed on the 
market. 7 •
.. Elizabeth Grossman, supra note I. 
.. STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 1 (1995); 
Excerpt from Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2000, pA, 
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Program, Office of Atmospheric Programs, United 
States Environmental Protection Agency, April 2002, available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/contentlemissions.html (last visited Feb. 
13,2005). 
70 See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, NASA Expert Criticizes Bush on Global Warming 
Policy, N.Y. Times, October 26, 2004, at A22. 
71 Statement of the Global Climate Coalition Before the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works Hearing on S. 556, the Clean Power Act, November 1, 
2001, at http://epw.senate.gov/107thlGlobal_Climate_Coalition.htm. 
'12 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. 
73 See, e.g., Automotive Resources International, Environmental Fleet Technol-
ogy Newsletter, Volume IV-Number IX, August 30, 2004, at 
http://www.arifleet.com/efnews/ef2004lEF0409.pdf(last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
7. See, e.g., George Raine, "Hybrid Buyers are Waiting in the Wings; Environ-
mentally Conscious Line Up to Buy Most Fuel-Efficient Cars," San Francisco Chroni-
cle, April 21, 2004, at AI. 
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The majority of Americans are dependent on petroleum 
fuel and inefficient automobiles, and while some have at-
tempted to reduce their use, petroleum-driven engines are far 
more available, socially accepted, and highly promoted than 
nonpolluting engines. The petro industry has failed to warn 
the public of health harms and opposed all efforts to lowering 
fuel economy.75 Yet, the petro industry is costing California 
billions not only in Medicare expenses, but also in environ-
mental cleanup costS.76 The far-reaching and pernicious im-
pacts of the oil industry necessitate a legal effort similar to the 
tobacco tort litigation to control or reduce the industry's ad-
verse impacts. 
B. PUBLIC COSTS 
It is estimated that reducing oil consumption could con-
ceivably result in tens of billions of dollars per year to the U.S. 
economy and increased leverage on the climate-change prob-
lem, "whose potential costs are huge but incalculable.'7'77 Public 
costs that could be estimated and recovered for harm caused by 
using petroleum products include health costs, air- and water-
pollution costs, environmental cleanup costs, and crop produc-
tivity losses:" In 1997 Americans paid $4 billion, or $.05 per 
gallon of gasoline, in additional cost due to ozone-related respi-
ratory health problems, and up to tens of billions of dollars, or 
$.59 per gallon of diesel, in additional costs due to increased 
morbidity and premature mortality caused by particulates and 
acidic aerosols.79 This estimate is based on multiple studies in 
different years, and it provides one indication of the amount of 
7. See, e.g. Statement of the Global Climate Coalition Before the Senate Commit-
tee on Environment and Public Works Hearing on S. 556, the Clean Power Act, Novem-
ber 1, 2001, at http://epw.senate.gov/107thlGiobaCClimate_Coalition.htm (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2005) 
76 See infra notes 77-100 and accompanying text. 
77 STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 2-3 (1995). 
78 Moore, J. et aI., Oil Imporls: An Overview and Update of Economic and Secu-
rity Effects, December 12, 1997, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
98-1, at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/energy/eng-
53.cfm?&CFID=19135639&CFTOKEN=76079875 (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). 
78 Id. 
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California's Medicare expenses that could be recoverable for 
petro-related harms.ao 
Environmental, health, and social costs represent the larg-
est portion of the externalized price Americans pay for their 
gasoline reliance, totaling $231.7 to $942.9 billion every year.al 
An estimated $29.3 to $542.4 billion of this is just for uncom-
pensated health costs associated with automobile emissions.a2 
A 1999 estimate placed the national external costs of air pollu-
tion from motor vehicles between $24.3 billion and $450 billion, 
and the total national direct costs of adverse health effects due 
to air pollution at $54.7 billion to $672.3 billion a year.a3 These 
figures represent costs for everything from headaches to hospi-
talization, asthma attacks to respiratory illness, and chronic 
illness to mortality.a. Particulate matter (PM-IO) accounted for 
the vast majority of these costs ($16.7 billion to $432 billion).a5 
In the Los Angeles area, health-related air pollution dam-
ages can run between $7.8 billion to $88.6 billion a year.a6 It is 
projected that in 1992, the annual economic value of avoiding 
air pollution health effects in the South Coast Air Basin of 
California, in which Los Angeles is located, was nearly $10 bil-
lion. a7 Attaining commensurate air pollution standards would 
have saved 1,600 lives.88 Lost productivity due to illness caused 
by auto-related air pollution is also a major cost to society and 
the economy."9 
Other estimates of external public costs, such as tax sub-
sidization of the oil industry, government program subsidies, 
60 Id. (illtimately a similar cost analysis to that done in the tobacco litigation 
would be necessary for exact figures.); See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text. 
81 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF 
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projects/trans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2005). ICTA is a think tank. founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom 
Doggett, Real Cost Of u.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998. 
82 Id. 
83 Mark A. Delucchi, Environmental Externalities of Motor-Vehicle Use in the US, 
JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol. 34, part 2, Publication No. UCD-
ITS-RP-00-14 at 135-168 (2000) . 
.. Id. 
85 Id. 
86 McCubbin, Donald R. and Mark A. Delucchi, The Health Costs of Motor Vehicle 
Related Air Pollution, JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Publication 
No. UCD·ITS-RP-99-16 (1999). 
87 Jane V. Hall, et al, Valuing the Health Benefits of Clean Air, Science, Vol. 255, 
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protection costs in oil shipment and motor vehicle services, en-
vironmental, health, and social costs of gasoline usage, and 
other externalities of motor vehicle use, total $558.7 billion to 
$1.69 trillion per year.90 When added to the retail price of gaso-
line, this makes the real per gallon price of gas between $5.60 
and $15.14.91 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS 
Environmental costs that petro plaintiffs may be able to 
recover based on expense totals kept in the state's public re-
cords are abatement, regulatory, and remediation costs not re-
covered from the responsible parties.92 Estimates of annual 
values for significant environmental externalities include 
global warming ($3 to $27.5 billion) and water pollution ($8.4 
to $36.8 billion).93 A more conservative estimate finds water 
pollution associated with motor vehicle use (such as leaking 
tanks, oil spills, and polluted runoff) results in environmental, 
economic, and health costs of $0.4 to 1.5 billion annually.9' 
Other costs associated with localized air pollution attributable 
to gasoline-powered automobiles include decreased agricultural 
yields ($2.1 to $4.2 billion), reduced visibility ($6.1 to $44.5 bil-
lion), and damage to buildings and materials ($1.2 to $9.6 bil-
lion).95 
The petro industry "indirectly" causes the growth of urban 
sprawL 96 Even the impact of urban sprawl adds to the eco-
90 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF 
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projectsltrans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2005). ICTA is a think tank founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom 
Doggett, Real Cost Of U.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998. 
9' Id. 
92 See, e.g., John J. McAleese III, Using the Freedom of Information Act in Super-
fund cases; Tactical Approaches to Evidence, ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND 
LITIGATION STRATEGIES, 1 (Mar. 1996). 
93 Id . 
.. Mark A. Delucchi, Environmental Externalities of Motor-Vehicle Use in the US, 
JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT ECONOMICS AND POLICY, Vol. 34, part 2, Publication No. UCD-
ITS-RP-00-14 at 135-168 (2000) . 
.. INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, THE REAL PRICE OF 
GAS available at http://www.icta.org/projectsltrans/rlprexsm.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 
2005). ICTA is a think tank founded the Jacques Ellul Society. See generally Tom 
Doggett, Real Cost Of U.S. Gasoline Is $15.14 Per Gallon?, REUTERS, Nov. 18, 1998. 
96 Id. The nature of petro dependence breeds a social structure of long, ineffi-
cient commutes, evidenced by the 1.5 billion gallons of fuel annually - nearly 36 million 
barrels of oil - that the U.S. saved since the 19908 through increased use of public 
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nomic consequences wrought by the petro industry.·7 These 
include "additional environmental degradation (up to $58.4 
billion), aesthetic degradation of cultural sites (up to $11.7 bil-
lion), social deterioration (up to $58.4 billion), additional mu-
nicipal costs including costs of regulatory agencies (up to $53.8 
billion), and additional transportation costs (up to $145 bil-
lion). "98 Researchers in the field of transportation cost analysis 
reduce their totals by twenty-five to fifty percent to account for 
any error in the cost analysis." Still they "arrive at a total of 
$163.7 to $245.5 billion per year. moo 
III. PROPOSAL 
A. PETRO TORT LITIGATION MADE FEASmLE BY TOBACCO 
LITIGATION 
The fruits of asbestos litigation made it feasible to under-
write tobacco litigation and now the fruits of tobacco litigation 
may make it feasible to underwrite petroleum litigation. 101 In 
tobacco and asbestos litigation, alliances between state and 
"private" attorneys general created sufficient resources to with-
stand tobacco industry defenses. 102 While this alliance may 
once again be necessary, the same legal tactics and tort theo-
ries, such as products liability and nuisance, may possess an 
even greater likelihood of success against the petro industry. loa 
transport. NRDC, Reducing U.S. Oil Dependence, at 
http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/fensec.asp#note19 (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). Reduced 





101 Michael L. Rustad, supra note 50, at 517. 
102 Michael L. Rustad, supra note 50, at 519; See Henry Weinstein & Myron 
Levin, Tobacco Companies Flood Internet with Documents Litigation, 27 Million Pages 
are Posted to Deflect Critics, Charges They're Hiding Damaging Information, LA. 
TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1988, at AI; See generally Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 
F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that in asbestos litigation "punitive damages 
reward individuals who serve as 'private attorneys general' in bringing wrongdoers to 
account."). 
103 See discussion supra, Section I. 
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B. TOBACCO TORT LITIGATION THEORIES APPLIED TO 
CALIFORNIA PETRO TORT LITIGATION 
447 
California is an appropriate first venue for petro tort liti-
gation, as it has often been at the forefront of environmental 
protection. It has, for example, pioneered legislation directed 
at controlling vehicle emissions. 'o, As early as 1947, California 
enacted enabling legislation so local jurisdictions could cope 
with particular pollution-control problems. 105 Moreover, it is 
the only state with a waiver from federal fuel regulations. 'oo In 
regard to products liability, it is the birthplace of strict liabil-
ity.107 It also has a favorable political climate. The feasibility of 
a California common-law products liability and public-nuisance 
suit against petro defendants, namely petroleum fuel and in-
ternal combustion engine ("ICE") manufacturers, will thus be 
the focus of this Comment, though the same theories can be 
applied elsewhere. 
1. Petro Plaintiff Standing 
Any petro tort lawsuit begins with the preliminary ques-
tion of whether the plaintiffs would have legal standing to 
bring a petro tort suit. In two cases based on common-law 
theories of products liability and nuisance against the petro 
industry for motor-vehicle emissions-related harms, the courts 
found the plaintiffs pled as indeterminately large groups that 
the courts felt had too divergent of interests to be fairly adjudi-
cated. lOB In Diamond, the plaintiffs alleged tort theories of 
products liability and nuisance against automobile manufac-
turers, petroleum refiners, gasoline filling stations, and others 
for injury from the pollution caused by use of petroleum prod-
104 City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1269 n.17 (7'h Cir. 
1972). 
lOS [d. 
lOS Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc. v. Davis, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 
2001), affd, 331 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2003). 
107 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (1944). 
lOB Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1971); City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1971), 
affd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7'h Cir. 1972). In a similar action initiated by several states before 
the Supreme Court, the Court declined to exercise original jurisdiction, holding that 
the issue was best decided locally. Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 
116 (1972). 
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uctS.'09 The plaintiffs attempted to represent a class by aggre-
gating 7,119,184 claims based on their common status as prop-
erty owners, for unliquidated damages arising out of 7,119,184 
special injuries. llO The court found each individual plaintiff re-
quired a determination of the fact of injury separately as to 
each resident as against each defendant and the plaintiffs had 
joined defendants without alleging any facts that would make 
them jointly or vicariously liable. III The court of appeal af-
firmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal based on prob-
lems of trial and proof, finding the class claim " ... beyond [the 
trial court's] effective capability."ll2 In City of Chicago, Chicago 
sought to represent all Illinois citizens who were residents of 
Chicago whose health and welfare had been endangered by the 
defendant's activities. ll3 The court did not think Chicago ade-
quately represented the class, as some of the members would 
be adversely affected by the suit, such as motor vehicle dealers 
and retail gas outlet owners.ll4 
The recent wave of tobacco litigation overcame these legal 
hurdles to standing, as can petroleum litigation. ll5 Although the 
California court of appeal in Diamond held the size of the 
plaintiff class (over seven million), the diversity of their inter-
ests, and the multiplicity of issues would make the proceeding 
unmanageable, it stated that the dismissal "is not a bar either 
to individual actions, or to other class actions appropriately 
framed."ll6 No plaintiff has attempted a similar litigation since 
Diamond. The outcome of Diamond suggests petro pollution 
litigants can get a case heard on its merits. The plaintiffs, 
however, must either be smaller groups with more particular-
ized harm, or state officials. For example, children suffering 




113 City of Chicago, 332 F. Supp. at 288. 
114 Id. Dictum indicated the court thought unemployment would harm a consid-
erable number of these people. Id. However, requiring more stringent air pollution 
standards, or an alternative energy market, would undoubtedly create jobs. Id. Also, a 
provision in the suit could require that middlemen in the petro market be outfitted 
with the means to sell the new types of vehicles and fuel at the petro industry's ex-
pense.Id. The court also felt the city did not adequately represent those individuals 
who were "strongly attached" to motor vehicles. Id. Arguably, those people are not 
strongly attached but have no choice. Id. 
115 See supra notes 14-52 and accompanying text. 
116 Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 641-643 & n. 5. 
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from respiratory illnesses caused or exacerbated by tailpipe 
emissions living in proximity to highways or heavily trafficked 
streets are a more "manageable" group than the putative class 
in Diamond.l17 If farmers sue for decreased productivity caused 
by pollution, such claims of injury to business or property may 
warrant standing since "a diminished crop yield would consti-
tute injury to commercial interests.",18 Another possible group 
that may have standing is a nonprofit organization, such as an 
environmental organization or the American Lung Associa-
tion. u9 It has been suggested that all coastal states may have 
standing based on harms caused by global warming, such as 
"rising sea levels due to thawing permafrost and melting and 
thinning sea ice.",20 Based on the outcome of the tobacco litiga-
tion, however, an action brought by the State Attorney General 
for reimbursement of Medi-Cal expenses or environmental 
cleanup expenditures appears to have the greatest likelihood of 
success. 121 
2. Likely Preemption Defenses 
In the tobacco tort litigation, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, held that a plaintiffs fail-
ure-to-warn and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims were 
preempted because they involved obligations within the mean-
ing of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
117 See supra notes 58 and 63-64. 
Ill! See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(in antitrust suit, court held farmers satisfied first requisite of standing under Clayton 
Act Section 4 for allegation of injury to "business or property" from defendant's con-
spiracy to eliminate anti-pollution devices). 
119 See, e.g., Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se plaintiff, in 
averring that his respiratory discomfort will be aggravated by emissions from develop-
ments on former federal lands, asserts an injury that is sufficiently concrete and par-
ticularized to satisfy standing); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 
168, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "the Residents have alleged concrete and particu-
larized injury in the form of increased traffic, pollution, and noise"); Sierra Club v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 129 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that interest in being 
free from increased auto emissions conferred standing) . 
120 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-Sa-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Cli-
mate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,22 (2003). 
121 See discussion supra Section I. Section 14124.71 of the California Welfare and 
Institutions Code authorizes a public entity to bring a cause of action on behalf of per-
sons receiving medical assistance from a government agency against a third party for 
reimbursement of medical expenses when the third party is responsible for the injury. 
In 1998 this provision was the used by California in its claim based on products liabil-
ity against the tobacco industry. 
21
Lipanovich: Smoke Before Oil
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
450 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
(hereinafter "FCLA") of 1965.'22 The Court held that other 
common-law claims not involving obligations within the 
FCLA's meaning were not preempted. '23 
In Cipollone, the Court stated preemption analysis begins 
with the assumption that federal law does not supersede "the 
historic police powers of the States ... unless [it] is the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress. "'24 The presumption against 
preemption of a state's police powers is strong. 125 If Congress 
intends to supersede this power it must do so either explicitly 
as stated in the express language of an act or implicitly as con-
tained in an act's structure and purpose. '26 In the absence of 
explicit statutory language, state law is preempted if it actually 
conflicts with an act, or if an act "so thoroughly occupies any 
legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States to supplement it."'27 If preemp-
tion is explicitly addressed, (applying a variation of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius) the court may find that the provi-
sion is a reliable indicium of congressional intent and refrain 
from inferring any Congressional intent beyond the preemption 
language. 128 
Relevant to petro litigation is the states' significant power 
to protect their air, water, and land, as well as the lives, health, 
and comfort of their residents. 129 In response to petro plaintiffs' 
state common-law claims, petro defendants will likely raise 
three federal laws as the basis of preemption defenses: the 
Clean Air Act (hereinafter "CAA "), Resource Conservation and 
122 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992). 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 516 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947». 
125 [d. at 524. 
126 [d. at 516 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977». 
127 [d. at 516 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 
141, 153 (1982». 
128 [d. at 516-517. 
126 As early as 1907 the United States Supreme Court wrote: "[Tlhe State has an 
interest independent of and behind the title of its citizens, in all the earth and air 
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of 
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air ... It is a fair and reasonable 
demand on the part of sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted .. 
. that that forests on its mountains ... should not be further destroyed or threatened .. 
. that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered .... " In re Multidis-
trict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973) (quoting Ga. v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907) (Court granted State's claim for an injunction, 
on behalf of mainly private citizen property owners, to enjoin defendant copper mines 
from discharging noxious gases). 
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Recovery Act (hereinafter "RCRA"), and Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (herein-
after "CERCLA"). 
a. CAA Preemption Defense 
Products liability and nuisance claims against petroleum 
fuel and ICE manufacturers may both face preemption de-
fenses based on the CAA. Petroleum fuel defendants, however, 
may have a weak defense. The CAA includes an express pre-
emption provision that prohibits the states from imposing any 
control or prohibition of motor vehicle fuels and fuel additives 
"for purposes of motor vehicle emission control."'30 One of the 
exceptions to this provision, however, is that the CAA permits 
California, as a state that regulated automotive emissions be-
fore Congress entered the field, to "at any time prescribe and 
enforce for the purpose of motor vehicle emission control, a con-
trol or prohibition respecting any fuel or fuel additive. "'31 In 
holding that California could enact a ban on the gasoline addi-
tive MTBE, for the purpose of preventing contamination to pri-
vate wells, the Ninth Circuit rejected express and implied pre-
emption arguments based on the CAA.132 It held California's 
waiver from federal fuel regulations is broad and unqualified 
and gives California a "freer hand than the EPA. "'33 The court 
found Congress's "clear and manifest purpose" was not "to pre-
empt the field where California is concerned. "134 It even held 
California may act to ban fuel for other purposes besides emis-
sion control. 135 While petro defendants will likely argue that 
allowing a common-law action for petroleum fuel would desta-
bilize the national economy and fuel supply, the Ninth Circuit's 
response to a similar argument regarding the ban of MTBE 
was that the CAA does not require California to consider the 
130 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2004). 
131 CAA § 211(c)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(B). California is the only state that 
"regulated automotive emissions prior to March 30, 1966. Thus, it is the only state 
that is eligible for [the) waiver" that exempts it from federal preemption of state regu-
lations of fuel standards under Section 7545(c)(4)(B). Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc., 163 
F. Supp. 2d at 1185 n.2. 
132 Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. 
133 Id. at 1184-85 
134 Id. at 1187. 
135 Id. at 1186. 
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national price and supply of gasoline. las A federal goal of ensur-
ing an adequate supply of a product was too speculative to sup-
port preemption. 137 
California common-law claims against ICE manufacturers 
have a less-certain outcome. ,a8 California's exemption from fed-
eral preemption of state regulation of fuel standards has yet to 
be applied to vehicle or engine-part requirements. '39 Currently, 
California may assert this waiver in defense of a state law re-
quiring reduction of carbon dioxide from automobiles. 140 But 
this case may take years to unfold. Favorable precedent exists 
for plaintiffs suing under common-law theories against station-
ary air polluters to overcome CAA preemption defenses, but no 
case speaks directly to the issue regarding mobile sources.'4l 
Section 209 of the CAA makes the direct application of station-
ary precedent difficult. Section 209(a) provides: 
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or at-
tempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emis-
sions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines .. 
No State shall require certification, inspection, or any 
other approval relating to the control of emissions from any 
new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition 
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registra-
tion of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equip-
ment. (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 209(a) (2004). 
Unless California's waiver is held to apply to ICEs, the petro 
industry's defenses here would be similar to the tobacco indus-
lll6 [d. at 1187-88. 
137 [d. 
138 The following policy analysis in support of state retention of authority under 
the CAA buttresses petro plaintiff's claims against petroleum fuel manufacturers. See 
infra notes 139-165 and accompanying text. 
139 Section 209(b) of the CAA establishing California's waiver from fuel regulation 
under Section 211(c)(4)(B), while arguably broad enough to cover the manufacture and 
sale of vehicle and engine parts, has strangely not been asserted. See, e.g., Engine 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt District, 541 U.S. 246, 252-258 (2004). 
140 Greenwire, Clean Air: Car Companies to Sue California Over Emissions Law, 
2004 WL 91332672, Dec. 7,2004. 
141 See National Audubon Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 
1988) (stating that any state nuisance claim addressing substantive law of air pollution 
under the CAA could be handled in state court); See also Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
798 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (W.O. Tex. 1992) (holding that preemption of state common 
law claims by the CAA would not further the goals of the CAA or the intent of Con-
gress). 
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try's preemption defenses in Cipollone.'42 Namely, that a fed-
eral law specifically relates to the applicable common-law 
claims but does not directly address the issue. Cipollone held 
the central inquiry in such a case is "whether the legal duty 
that is the predicate of the common law ... action" satisfies the 
act's express terms, giving those terms "a fair but narrow read-
ing."'43 Accordingly, petro plaintiffs' ICE tort claims would ap-
pear to be preempted if they rely on a state law that requires 
any "approval" relating to the control of emissions or attempts 
to create "any standard" relating to the control of emissions on 
new ICEs.'" 
The predicate duty of petro plaintiffs' products-liability 
claim is arguably a state-law duty not to place defective prod-
ucts on the market that cause injury to human beings.145 The 
predicate duty of their nuisance claims is a duty not to create 
anything that is injurious or offensive to the public health or 
comfort. '46 Proving these theories would not be based on a de-
termination of whether manufacturers complied with emissions 
standards or a demonstration that the engines do not comply 
with federal law. In Cipollone, the Court applied this analysis 
to decide that fraudulent-misrepresentation claims based on 
concealment of a material fact arising with respect to advertis-
ing and promotions are not preempted by the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling Act.147 The court decided such claims are not predi-
cated "on a duty 'based on smoking and health' but rather on a 
more general duty not to deceive."148 Petro plaintiffs could simi-
larly assert their claims are not based on a duty to comply with 
Federal emissions standards, but rather on a more general ob-
ligation - the duty not to injure human beings and natural 
places. Preempting such claims would be effectively allowing 
zones of sacrifice. 
The CAA's savings provision, absent in the act analyzed in 
Cipollone, increases petro plaintiffs' chances of defeating a pre-
emption defense based on the CAA.149 The CAA's savings provi-
142 See infra notes 143-148. 
143 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524. 
144 Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 541 U.S. at 257. 
145 See discussion supra Section II. 
146 [d. 
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sion retains substantial retention of state authority.'5o It states 
that, except in limited circumstances, "[n]othing in [the] Act 
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdi-
vision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation 
respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement 
respecting control or abatement of air pollution . . . m5' From 
this the Ninth Circuit observed that the CAA envisions, with-
out specifically authorizing, other remedial actions where such 
are grounded in statute or common law.'52 The Supreme Court 
has held savings clauses allow for a narrow reading of a statute 
that preserves common-law claims.'5a 
Courts have noted several other provisions of the CAA that 
further support retention of state authority and a narrow read-
ing of Section 209(a).'54 When drafting the CAA, Congress 
found "that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or 
elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants 
produced or created at the source) and air pollution control at 
its source is the primary responsibility of States and local gov-
ernments.'''55 The Supreme Court held that Congress recog-
nizes the CAA is not a uniform, nationwide solution to every 
aspect of air pollution. '56 Furthermore, the CAA states Con-
gress's purpose is "to provide technical and financial assistance 
to State and local governments in connection with the devel-
opment and execution of their air pollution prevention and con-
trol programs.'''5' To this end, citizens, states, and local gov-
ernments are empowered to initiate actions to enforce compli-
ance with the Act and to enforce other statutory and common-
law rights.'5s 
150 Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n Inc., v. Davis, 331 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2003). 
'5' 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (West 2004) . 
• 52 California ex rei. State Air Resources Bd. v. Dep't. of Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271, 
1293 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that Clean Air Act did not preempt state's air pollution 
action because state had broad power to implement air pollution strategies), affd 624 
F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980) . 
• 53 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) . 
... See, e.g., Oxygenated Fuels Ass'n Inc., 331 F.3d at 671. 
'55 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(3) (West 2004). 
156 Washington v. General Motors Corp. 406 U.S. 109, 114-116 (1972) (quoting 81 
Stat. 485,42 U. S. C. § 1857 (a)(3». 
157 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b)(3) (West 2004) (emphasis added) . 
• 58 CAA Section 304(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(e), provides: "Nothing in this sec-
tion shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to 
seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 
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The only legal effort testing the CAA preemption of state 
laws regulating emissions of motor vehicles occurred in the 
1970's:59 In the leading case on the issue of CAA preemption 
the Supreme Court directed that such cases are best decided 
locally. ISO Summarizing fields of CAA preemption, the Court 
noted that "standards" in regard to fuel emissions on new vehi-
cles are largely preempted. 161 This was prompted by the under-
lying suit filed by 18 states, with 16 filing amicus briefs in sup-
port of the states, seeking an order requiring automobile manu-
facturers to install anti-pollution control devices on all motor 
vehicles and to accelerate air pollution research. 162 Only one 
region tested this decision. ,s3 The Seventh Circuit held that a 
city action seeking to stop the sale of motor vehicles within the 
city unless the vehicles were equipped with tamper-proof emis-
sion control devices satisfied "standard" under the Section 
209(a) prohibition regarding regulation of new motor vehicles 
(post-1968).,s4 From the outcome of these cases, it appears a 
California court may find the definition of "standard" includes 
an action by a local governing body seeking an order requiring 
automobile (ICE) manufacturers to take proactive measures as 
to all vehicle models (engine types). Arguably in the case of 
common-law theories for damages, a different situation exists 
than as to a proactive measure being sought to be applied uni-
formly to all ICE manufacturers. ISS Rather, what is sought is 
the recovery of costs of public expenditures to redress harms 
caused by their products or an outright prohibition of the prod-
ucts. 
b. RCRA and CERCLA Preemption Defense 
A thicket of statutes and regulations govern environmental 
cleanup at petroleum-spill sites, possibly making it more diffi-
cult for petro plaintiffs, in actions for environmental cost recov-
'" Washington, 406 U.S. 109; City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 
1262 (7 th Cir. 1972); Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971). 
160 Washington, 406 U.S. at 111 & 113 fn 3. 
,., Id. 
162 Id. 
163 City of Chicago, 467 F.2d 1262. 
164 Id. at 1265. 
166 Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 642-643 (an appropriately pled common-law claim 
against defendant automobile manufacturers is not barred). 
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ery, to overcome preemption defenses. l66 Federal and state laws 
governing environmental cleanup cost recovery for petroleum 
contamination, however, do not facially or by case law preclude 
common-law tort actions for environmental harms, so the de-
fenses may be surmountable.167 
State enforcement cleanup actions can be brought under 
CERCLA or the Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Sub-
stance Account Act (hereinafter "CPTHSAA").168 CPTHSAA is a 
California law that authorizes cost recovery spent in environ-
mental response actions, yet excludes petroleum fuel from the 
hazardous substances covered by the act, as does CERCLA, the 
federal law it was modeled after. 169 Petro plaintiffs can argue 
against preemption defenses under either act because petro-
leum is not covered by their provisions, and the acts do not ex-
pressly preempt common-law tort actions:70 Since such exemp-
tions have precluded CPTHSAA plaintiffs seeking environ-
mental cleanup cost recovery under the general cost recovery 
mechanism of the California Hazardous Substance Account Act 
(hereinafter "HSAA") from recovering costs incurred in clean-
ing petroleum contamination in soil, petroleum's exclusion 
from the meaning of the act seems apparent.17I Also, the notes 
of decisions for the HSAA support the proposition that public 
166 Peter Manus, Federalism Under Siege at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal: Preemp-
tion and CERCLA after United States v. Colorado, 19 COLUM. J. ENTL. L. 327, 329 
(1994); Gregory M. Romano, Note, "Shovels First and Lawyers Later:" A Collision 
Course for CERCLA Cleanups and Environmental Torts Claims, 21 WM. & MARy 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV., 421, 422 (1997). 
167 Gregory M. Romano, supra note 166, at 422. 
168 See Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act 
("CPTHSAA"), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25300 (Deering's 2005); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or "Superfund"), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9628. 
169 In practice the state never uses state law; it always sues under CERCLA. 
Email Comm. with Cliff Rechtschaffen, Professor of Environmental Law, Golden Gate 
School of Law (Dec. 12, 2004). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317 (West 2005) states 
expressly that petroleum, crude oil, and crude oil "fractions" are excepted from the 
Act's reach. See also KFC Western Inc. v. Meghrig, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994). Section 101 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 (14) (West 2004) provides "The term 
"hazardous substance" ... does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any frac-
tion thereof ... (21) The term "release" ... [excludes] emissions from engine exhaust of 
motor vehicle, rolling rock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine." 
170 See, e.g., Rivas v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) (court held plaintiff's toxic tort claims not preempted by CERCLA but that they 
failed to meet the statute of limitations). 
171 mvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal 1993). 
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nuisance and California environmental laws are not preempted 
by cleanup laws. '72 
RCRA, the other commonly used enforcement authority for 
environmental cleanup sites, has neither a petroleum exclusion 
provision nor a provision preempting common-law tort actions. 173 
In 1986, RCRA was amended to include a leaking underground 
storage tank (hereinafter "LUST") provision, which specifically 
allows state and federal cost recovery from petroleum contamina-
tion resulting from LUSTs. 17. California law includes a similar 
provision. '75 While this may preempt the field with regard to 
LUSTs, plaintiffs claiming other types of petroleum contamination 
have pled common-law tort actions in addition to RCRA claims. l76 
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently noted that CERCLA's pur-
pose focuses on cleanup of hazardous waste sites and the imposi-
tion of all cleanup costs on responsible parties, as opposed to 
RCRA's focus on hazardous waste reduction. 177 The petroleum 
exclusion in CERCLA, therefore, arguably leaves the field of tort 
recovery of cleanup costs available for petroleum contamination.'7s 
Also, the discrepancy between the exclusion of petroleum as a 
hazardous substance in CERCLA and its inclusion in RCRA may 
indicate Congress did not intend the field to be preempted. When 
"a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading [any other congressional intent 
from] it."'79 Settlements under RCRA, CERCLA, and CPTHSAA 
are often far below actual out-of-pocket government expenditures, 
indicating a significant potential area of cost recovery for reim-
bursement of public dollars to petro plaintiffs. ISO 
172 California ex reI. California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 
F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1998). 
173 RCRA or (Solid Waste Disposal Act) §§ 1002-11012,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k). 
174 Section 9002 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6991b. 
175 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.70 (West 2005). 
17. See, e.g., Nixon-Egli Equip. Co. v. John A. Alexander Co., 949 F. Supp. 1435, 
1438 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Tenaya Assocs. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-F-92-5375, 
1995 WL 433290 at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 1993). 
177 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). 
178 See, e.g., id. at 485. 
179 [d. at 488 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 
11, 19 (1979». 
ISO A private citizen group could use a Freedom of Information Act Request to 
obtain the exact differences between money spent on site response and money recov-
ered from the petroleum companies. Government agencies already have access to this 
information. 
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3. Products Liability Causes of Action 
California petro plaintiffs, unlike their predecessor tobacco 
plaintiffs, do not have to wait for a statutory immunity protec-
tion to expire to bring products liability actions. lSI No specific 
California statute exempts petroleum and related products 
from products liability.ls2 So petro manufacturers are subject to 
California products liability law. 
Under product liability law in California, as stated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a product is capable of serious 
harm in the design, inspection, or fabrication of the product, 
the manufacturer owes a duty not just to the immediate pur-
chaser of the product, but to all persons who might foreseeably 
be affected by the product. l83 Liability may be based on theories 
of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, or misrepre-
sentation.lS< Claims may incorporate one or all of the underly-
ing theories. ls5 Regardless of the theory, though, the plaintiff 
must prove that a product is defective when used for its in-
tended purpose and was defective when it left the defendant's 
control, and its defect makes it unreasonably dangerous and 
proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. ISS In petro tort liti-
gation, strict liability and negligence appear particularly well-
suited to achieving products-liability's goals of insuring that 
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products be paid 
by the manufacturers that put such products on the market, 
rather than by injured persons who are powerless to protect 
themselves. ls7 
181 Rodney R. Moy, supra note 16, at 774 (referring to tobacco exemption repealed 
from Section 1714.45 of the California Civil Code). See also supra note 14 and accom-
panying text. 
182 Search on LexisNexis of Deering's California Codes Annotated, Court Rules, & 
ALS, Comb. (Oct. 4, 2004). 
183 Aas v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 627, 637 (2000) (citing MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916». 
184 Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. 
REV. 435 (1979); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: 
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974); 
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1193 (1994). 
185 Gary T. Schwartz, supra note 184; Marshall S. Shapo, supra note 184; Howard 
Latin, supra note 184. 
186 David Grossman, supra note 120, at 39. 
187 MacPherson, 111 N.E. 1050; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 
897 (Cal. 1963). Petro plaintiffs would be amiss to not alternatively allege negligence 
and strict liability design defect claims against petro manufacturers. Having explored 
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a. Proof of Causation 
A products-liability petro tort case in California may be 
tried under one of two variations of the standard of proof of 
causation. ISS Ordinarily, under products liability the plaintiff 
must prove that defective products supplied by the defendant 
were a substantial factor in bringing about his or her injury.IS9 
This substantial-factor test, the same as the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s, subsumes the cause-in-fact determination. 190 The second 
standard of proof is met by establishing a reasonable medical 
probability, based on expert testimony, that the defendant's 
conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injury.191 
Describing the need for the new standard of proof of causa-
tion, the California Supreme Court explained that plaintiffs 
cannot be expected to prove the scientifically unknown details 
of carcinogens or trace the unknowable path of a given toxic 
fiber. 192 This implies that a petro fuel manufacturer may be 
liable if it is proven individually that its product was a sub-
stantial factor in contributing to harm, without requiring trac-
ing the harm to a particular gallon of gas as the cause of the 
injury. The Court's preference for the new test is demonstrated 
by the Court's application of it in negligence and products li-
ability actions, and in decisions involving carcinogenic pharma-
ceuticals, asbestos, and a variety of other types of toxic chemi-
cal exposure. 193 Applying it to an asbestos design defect claim, 
the common law elements of such claims, I analyze only strict liability, which appears 
to have the greatest likelihood of success and to focus the greatest detail on the ele-
ments applicable to both claims, while keeping this comment to a manageable length. 
The alternative negligence claim deserves and requires its own detailed analysis. 
188 See, e.g., Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., 980 P.2d 398, 402 (Cal. 1999) 
(plaintiff alleged exposure to numerous different types of toxic chemicals caused can-
cer); Rutherford v. Owens-lllinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1218-1220 (Cal. 1997) (asbestos 
litigation); Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 861-863 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004). 
189 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1972); Endicott v. 
Nissan Motor Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see CACI No. 430 
(2004). 
190 Bockrath, , 980 P.2d at 403-04 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1213-1214). 
UI1 Rutherford, , 941 P.2d at 1218-1220 & n.ll (applied in asbestos litigation); 
Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case in which plaintiff alleged exposure to nu-
merous different chemical substances). 
192 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1219. 
193 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1220 & n.ll (applied in asbestos litigation); 
Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case where plaintiff alleged exposure to a variety 
of toxic chemicals caused cancer); Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 209 Cal. Rptr. 
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the Court asserted the gap in the "humanly unknowable" can 
be bridged by showing "in reasonable medical probability" that 
the alleged designs of the products were a substantial factor 
contributing to the dose of carcinogens inhaled or ingested and 
hence to the plaintiff's risk of developing lung cancer. I .' 
The same facts in these types of toxic-tort cases led the 
courts away from Summers' alternative liability theory to Sin-
dell's market-share liability theory. 105 Market-share liability 
theory, however, has only been applied in one circumstance, 
"where hundreds of producers ... had made the same drug 
from an identical formula, practically precluding patients from 
identifying the makers of the drugs they [ingested]. m06 Whether 
market-share liability would be permitted in tobacco or petro 
litigation is unclear in California, though other states have 
held it is appropriate in tobacco litigation authorized by stat-
ute.107 Given the complicated nature of causation in toxic torts 
and the newness of the reasonable medical probability test, 
some uncertainty also remains about whether it would be ap-
plied in petro litigation and the effect it would have on the 
plaintiff's case. lOS 
456, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); see also Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
739,747-748 and n.ll (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
194 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219 & fn.ll (applied in asbestos litigation); Bockrath, 
980 P.2d at 402 (applied in case in which plaintiff alleged exposure to numerous differ-
ent chemical substances). 
195 See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218 (explaining that when all potential tortfea-
sors are not before the court application of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), 
joint and several liability is unfair); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 
1980). 
196 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-19. 
197 [d. See, e.g., Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 
678 So. 2d 1239, 1247 (Fla. 1996) (holding that Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability 
Act could use either market-share liability or joint and several liability, but not both). 
198 See, e.g., Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-863. It is also uncertain if the Su-
preme Court's language in Rutherford would be followed exactly. It stated to be a 
substantial factor the product's contribution to the plaintiff or decedent's risk or prob-
ability of developing cancer must be substantial, it need not be a substantial factor 
actually contributing to the injury. Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1219-1220. Whiteley held 
the plaintiffs must establish to a reasonable medical probability, their illnesses were 
caused by the toxic exposure. See, Bockrath, 980 P.2d 403-404 (remanding case back to 
the trial court to allow plaintiffs to amend complaints on issue of causation). The un-
certainty of the new test on the plaintiff's case has been discussed in Rutherford, 941 
P.2d at 1218-1219 (the majority stating that the substantial factor standard is so broad 
convincing a jury each product caused exposure should not be that difficult; the dissent 
stating the decision will mean many innocent plaintiffs have an insurmountable bur-
den in establishing that exposure to a specific defendant's product was a substantial 
cause of injury.). See also Jonathan C. Mosher, A Pound of Cause for a Penny of Proof" 
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The most telling sign that a petro plaintiff's case may war-
rant the new reasonable medical probability test is that it ap-
plies in products-liability actions involving claims for relief 
arising from chronic and latent illnesses or disease allegedly 
caused by exposure to toxic substances.199 Recently a court 
found cigarettes easily fit this description but did not deter-
mine which variant on proof of causation applied, because it 
found the evidence of causation insufficient under either test."OO 
Also, in a setting analogous to that of petro products exposure, 
the test has been held appropriate to show causation in an oc-
cupational setting with many different sources making it diffi-
cult to pinpoint the source. 201 That case held that causation can 
be properly alleged under the new test, but the test's version of 
"substantial factor" must be proven as to each defendant.202 
Generally speaking, characteristics of cases warranting the 
reasonable medical probability test include complex and in-
scrutable questions of medical causation, involving harm that 
flows from a class of products with different toxicities and 
brands of products that have differing effects on different prod-
uct-related diseases. 203 
Although basic standards of proof of causation seem appli-
cable to ICEs, petroleum fuel may be found to fit these charac-
teristics. Arguably, petroleum fuel, like asbestos and ciga-
rettes, is in a class of products that have differing propensities 
of various forms of products to cause injury and disease. For 
example, in asbestos-containing products the specific type of 
asbestos fiber incorporated into a product, the physical proper-
ties of the product itself, and the percentage of asbestos used in 
the product all affect the corresponding potential for inducing 
The Failed Economy of an Eroded Causation Standard in Toxic Tort Cases, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 531 (2003) alleging the ruling invites any plaintiff to establish cause; and 
V. Thomas Meador III, et. aI., Anti-Toxins: Defense Counsel in Mass Toxic Tort Cases 
Can Frequently Prevail By Challenging Plaintiffs' Proof of Both General and Specific 
Causation, 26 L.A. LAWYER 33 (2003) (alleging the ruling invites defense counsel to 
take advantage of the "frequent inability of plaintiffs to prove general and specific 
causation"). 
199 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1218-1219. 
200 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861-863. 
,",I Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 402-404. 
ro2 1d. 
'"" See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1216-19; Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 861-863. 
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asbestos-related disease. 204 Similarly, the blends and octanes of 
petroleum fuel affect the corresponding potential for inducing 
petroleum pollution related disease. 205 A similar analogy can 
also be made to cigarette blends, styles, and toxicity. 
Under either causation test, petro plaintiffs in a defective 
design suit will have to prove that it is the design of the prod-
uct that caused the injury. The widely accepted belief that 
automobile emissions are responsible for significant levels of 
air pollution in metropolitan areas suggests the causation bur-
den of proof can be met. Undoubtedly, if the reasonable medi-
cal probability test is allowed and the evidence shows that the 
design of the petro defendant's products contributed to plain-
tiffs injuries, the causation element would be satisfied. If not, 
the actions that satisfy a substantial-factor test in California 
are still relatively broad.20G A force that plays only a theoretical 
part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substan-
tial factor, but a very minor force that does cause harm is a 
substantial factor.207 Under either test the standard of proof 
must be met as to each defendant if more than one type of de-
fendant manufacturer is involved (otherwise market-share li-
ability could apply).20B Proof of feasible alternative designs will 
not affect the outcome under strict products liability if upon 
hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the product's design 
is unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders:o, This is contrary 
to negligent-design products liability, where causation will tum 
on proof that the manufacturer's negligence in not using a fea-
sible alternative safer design is the cause of the injury.210 
With regard to ICEs, City of Chicago calls into question 
whether the breadth of causation for such a claim is allowed 
20< Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affd, 
826 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1987). 
206 See supra, notes 56-61 and accompanying text. 
2<l6 Bockrath, 980 P.2d at 403-404 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1214-1215). 
207 [d. at 403-04 (quoting Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1214-1215) (citation omitted). 
208 [d. at 404 (a case based on a uniform product market share liability as outlined 
in Sindell, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), could relieve plaintiffs burden of proving substan-
tial factor to each defendant). 
209 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 (Cal. 1978). However, 
the availability of alternative feasible design may come into issue in the context of 
assessing punitive damages. 
210 See, e.g., Whiteley, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862-864. 
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under common-law principles of products liability.211 The court 
determined that alleging all cars as defective created an impos-
sibly indeterminate number of sources to prove that any par-
ticular vehicle "caused any particular injury to any particular 
person. "212 One way petro plaintiffs might be able to circumvent 
this legal hurdle is alleging claims in groups divided by which 
of the Big Four automobile manufacturers made their vehicle 
and further divided into subcategories of owners of spark igni-
tion ICEs, which is the dominant passenger car and light truck 
engine, and owners of diesel ICEs, which constitutes largely 
the rest of the market.213 Each owner would be suing for harm 
caused by his or her particular product, but the claims would 
be aggregated in a class action. This allegation would be based 
on the same types of theories used to sue defendant manufac-
turers for other car parts.214 
One way the causal link was made in the tobacco cases 
was the introduction of statistical methods of proof.215 Plaintiffs 
in the tobacco litigation were allowed to show that a widely 
distributed product increased the aggregate number of state 
residents who contracted a disease; such as lung cancer.216 In 
fact, this method of proving causation seems to be widely ac-
cepted in cancer-related cases: in the tobacco litigation, be-
tween 1994 and 1998, Florida, Vermont, and Maryland all 
adopted legislation permitting proof by statistical analysis;217 
while Mississippi, Texas, and Minnesota each intended to use 
statistical analysis without enacting special legislation.218 In 
toxic-tort cases involving exposure to the drug Bendectin, as 
well as silicone, herbicides, and asbestos, courts have allowed 
211 City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1972). 
Though arguably the court was referring to Illinois products liability law, the same 
issue exists in California. 
212 Id. 
213 STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 80 (1995). 
214 Self v. General Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) 
(holding that the placement and welding of the car's fuel tank constituted defective 
design as manufacturer is required to design his vehicle to minimize unreasonable 
risks of injury and death). 
215 Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Liability, 85 VA. L. REV. 329, 
330-31 (1999). 
21·Id. 
217 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(X) (West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I 
§ 15-120 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1911(f)(5) (2003). 
218 Walker & Monahan, supra note 215. 
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statistical evidence to demonstrate causation where direct 
proof of causation was lacking.'19 The prevalence of acceptance 
of this method of proof is further evidenced by its use in other 
types of cases, like human rights violations and trade cases."o 
In general, courts have considered statistical associations as 
sufficient to satisfy the requisite more-probable-than-not stan-
dard, only if they are supplemented by expert testimony, credi-
ble scientific evidence, and demonstrated exposure to the prod-
uct more than doubled the likelihood the plain tiff suffered the 
injury."l This is clearly a formidable task. The advancement of 
current scientific and medical technologies may make it possi-
ble, however, for petro plaintiffs to prove petro-product-related 
health harms if the courts accept such evidence as causation, 
such as the signature diseases of asbestosis in asbestos cases 
and clear cell adenocarcinoma in DES cases.'" 
Generally speaking, in toxic-tort cases, courts have not 
found differences among degrees of manufacturer liability to 
preclude finding them properly joined. ,,3 The presence of other 
sources of air pollution, however, may confuse the issue of cau-
sation in petro litigation. Such cases involving the presence of 
other potentially liable sources do not generally result in 
avoidance of liability altogether, but rather a reduction in 
plaintiff's recovery by comparative-fault principles.'" In a case 
219 In re Joint E. & S. District Asbestos Litigation, 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989)(regarding exposure to the 
drug Bendectin); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 
1996)(regarding exposure to silicone); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. 
Supp. 1223 (E.D. N.Y. 1985), affd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 
1234 (1988) (regarding exposure to herbicide). 
220 See, e.g., In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 910 F. 
Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995), affd, sub nom. Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 
F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (statistics based on surveys allowed to establish causation in trade-
mark infringement case). 
221 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Grossman, supra note 120, at 23. 
222 David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 23. 
223 See, e.g., Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210 (asbestos litigation); Bockrath v. 
Aldrich Chemical Co., 980 P.2d 398, 402 (Cal. 1999) (alleged exposure to numerous 
different toxic chemicals cause of cancer); Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 807, 861-863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
224 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210 (decedent who smoked a pack of cigarettes 
a day for over 30 years allowed to recover for lung cancer caused by asbestos dust expo-
sure.). In tort actions governed by principles of comparative fault a defendant shall 
only be severally liable for damages "in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage 
offault." Prop 51, Civ. Code Section 1432.2(a) (adopted in 1986). 
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in which a smoker sued asbestos manufacturers for lung cancer 
caused by asbestos exposure, the court awarded damages but 
reduced them by principles of comparative negligence.225 
The presence of intermediary products in the causal chain 
between the petroleum fuel, the ICE, and the emissions may 
further diminish the plaintiff's recovery. The obstacle posed by 
intermediary products is mitigated, however, when it is consid-
ered that while a number of parts of the vehicle could be al-
leged to contribute to reduced fuel efficiency, only one is the 
"cause" of the emissions - the engine.226 The ICE in petro suits, 
as the lighter in tobacco suits, involves a foreseeable use of the 
products that likely will not preclude either petroleum fuel or 
ICE manufacturer liability. 
The petro defendant's defense to claims of causation will 
likely be similar to previous tobacco industry assumption-of-
risk defenses. The need to counter the assumption-of-risk de-
fense may not be present in petro litigation as arguably the 
public has no other choice than to buy vehicles. This counter-
argument is especially applicable to children who are exposed 
to emissions involuntarily.227 A person is deemed to have con-
sented under the law only if his or her consent was given vol-
untarily and with full understanding.228 
b. A Defective Design Action Brought Under Strict Products 
Liability 
A strict-liability design claim against petro manufacturers 
asserts that they are strictly liable in tort for placing petroleum 
fuel and ICEs on the market knowing they are to be used with-
out inspection for defects, and as a result of design defects in-
jure people.229 The petro manufacturers claim that their con-
duct was reasonable will not relieve them of liability, only the 
existence of injury caused by a defect in their products is the 
225 Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1209-1210. 
226 Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, Advanced Automotive Tech-
nology: Visions of a Super-Efficient Family Car, OTA-ETI-638, GPO stock #052-003-
01440-8, p.60-129 September 1995. 
227 David Slawson, The Right to Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S. Ca. L. Rev. 
672,755 (1986). 
228 Id. 
229 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
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focus of the liability inquiry.230 The strict-liability theory that 
California adopted in 1968, embodied in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) Section 402A, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer ... is subject to li-
ability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user 
or consumer ... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach 
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condi-
tion in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the 
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not 
bought the product from or entered into any contractual rela-
tion with the seller.231 
A "defect" under products liability may take the form of 
mismanufacture, failure to give adequate warnings or instruc-
tions for safe use, defective design or formulation, or failure to 
truthfully represent the quality of the product!3' A mismanu-
facturing-defect claim alleges a product is not made in accord 
with its intended design!33 In warning-defect claims, as some 
tobacco plaintiffs alleged, liability is dependent on consumers' 
behavior changing if provided with appropriate warnings.'3' 
Neither of these factual claims appears applicable to the facts 
of petro tort litigation. A design-defect claim, however, as Cali-
fornia alleged in its tobacco claim, alleges that the harm arises 
from the design of the product itself, and this appears to be a 
perfect fit for petro plaintiffs' claims.235 Petro plaintiffs might 
be able to sue ICE and petro fuel manufacturers in a design-
230 [d. 
231 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) § 1243, p. 678). Jenkins v. T&N 
PLC, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich 
Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968). 
232 Gary T. Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 267 Colum. L. 
Rev. 435 (1979); Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protec-
tion: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 
(1974); Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products and Cognitive Limitations, 41 
UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1994). 
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defect suit, arguing that the defects of the automotive and fuel 
generation designs are the unnecessary production of signifi-
cant amounts of toxic chemicals and greenhouse gases, which 
lead to plaintiffs' harms from breathing polluted air and global 
warming.""· 
In California, two legal methods are used to determine if a 
product's design is defective: the risk-benefit test and the con-
sumer-expectation test.237 Under the risk-benefit test, the de-
sign is defective if an inherent danger in the design of a prod-
uct outweighs the benefits of the design.238 Under the con-
sumer-expectation test, the design is defective if the product 
fails to perform as safely as an ordinary user would expect 
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner:39 
The latter test is applied in California cases when the ordinary 
consumer has a reasonable experience or expectation about an 
element of the product's performance claimed to be defective, 
but it is not usually applied if the alleged defect is complex and 
technical. 2<0 Although the Third Edition of the Restatement of 
Torts rejects the consumer-expectation test as an independent 
theory, the California Supreme Court declined to overrule it 
and established it as an independent and alternative test for a 
product defect.241 
The consumer-expectation test's requirement that the 
product be in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate con-
sumer is based on the ultimate consumer having "ordinary 
knowledge common to the community" as to the product's char-
236 The legal causation standard is substantiality. All petro defendants that are 
substantial causes can be found jointly and severally liable for the harm, subject to 
apportionment if feasible. See discussion supra notes 188-228 and accompanying text. 
237 Pietrone v. American Honda Motor Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987). 
238.Anderson v. Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (Cal. 1991). 
239 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 453-454 (Cal. 1978). California 
cases have conceded that this concept of "design defect" is a difficult area of precise 
definition, so when not compelled by statute, the doctrine's acceptance and the terms of 
its applicability have been determined to a large extent by the fundamental policies 
that underlie it, as set out in Yuba Power Products, Inc., and its progeny. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553 (referring to Yuba Power Products, Inc., 
377 P.2d 897.) 
240 Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 307-9 (Cal. 1995). 
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (proposed final draft Apr. 1, 1997 Section 2, 
com. g, p. 29); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998). But see also McCabe v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr. 
310, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a product may perform so unsafely that what-
ever the user may have expected, it certainly wasn't that). 
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acteristics. 2' 2 This basis became a turning point in the tobacco 
litigation when it was discovered the tobacco industry was de-
ceiving consumers as to their product's characteristics, thereby 
preventing consumers from learning of the characteristics.2' 3 
Similarly, petro plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate that the 
petro industry has deceived consumers by creating a public 
smokescreen that alternatives are unavailable and their prod-
ucts are environmentally friendly .. •• For instance, the petro 
industry, similarly to the tobacco industry, knows of the many 
harms caused by the use of their products, yet many companies 
have ad campaigns touting themselves as eco-friendly. Fur-
ther, they currently fight efforts at increasing fuel economy 
standards, have not made alternatives available, and may even 
have conspired to keep safer alternatives off the market."6 Fur-
ther, numerous hidden harms may exist that the petro indus-
try is aware of but fails to make known to its consumers. Ex-
amples of hidden health harms include that fact that ordinary 
drivers probably do not realize the health harms caused by pe-
troleum emissions. 2' 6 Hidden cost externalities are found in the 
fact that ordinary drivers probably do not realize what a trip to 
the store really costS. 2' 7 Global warming is a hidden harm be-
cause ordinary drivers probably do not realize that a history of 
emissions is associated with each gallon in the extraction, re-
fining, and transport processes"'· Additionally, underground 
storage tanks ("USTs") are literally and figuratively a hidden 
harm because ordinary drivers probably do not know that 
USTs exist, much less that they leak pollutants.2'. Ordinary 
drivers probably do not realize the extent of harm caused by oil 
refineries or the extent of harm occurring in other countries 
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i. 
243 See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text. 
245 See id. Evidence such as a suit brought then dropped by the Department of 
Justice in the 60's suggests the petro industry has in fact conspired to keep safer alter-
natives off the market. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution v. General 
Motors Corp., 367 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (state alleged agreement among 
manufacturers and other acts of delay in development of automobile air pollution con-
trol devices). 
246 See supra Section II. I. 
247 See supra Section 11.2. 
248 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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because of oil use.250 Finally, retail gas outlets are hidden 
harms because ordinary drivers probably do not realize con-
sumer overfills at gas outlets, as well as jobber overfills of un-
derground storage tanks, are significantly contributing to 
groundwater, river, and ocean pollution.251 Just as in the to-
bacco litigation, if it is shown that petro plaintiffs' are being 
deceived, and safer alternatives are being kept off the market 
by the industry itself, the petro industry may not be able to 
assert a persuasive assumption-of-risk defense. 252 In sum, petro 
defendants may argue that consumers have no real expecta-
tions about the risk of such harm, so the consumer expectation 
test should not be applied; petro plaintiffs may counter that 
just as in the tobacco tort litigation, the petro industry should 
be held accountable since it has concealed and hidden the 
harms and alternatives.253 
Additionally, petro plaintiffs may argue that an ordinary 
consumer has a reasonable expectation when buying a car that 
the ICE performs safely and when buying fuel that it does not 
cause health and global harms. In support of their claims, 
petro plaintiffs may be able to compare petroleum fuel to asbes-
tos and other hazardous substances that release toxic byprod-
ucts to convince the court that, as in those cases, the consumer 
expectations test applies here.254 Regarding asbestos, the courts 
have found that the emission during normal use of toxic respir-
able fibers that were capable of causing a fatal disease consti-
tuted a product failure that violated the commonly accepted 
assumptions of ordinary consumers. 255 If this is found to be true 
260 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also, State of Denial, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 27,2001, available at http://www.sacbee.comldenial (last visited 
on Feb. 6, 2005). 
251 See, e.g., Steve Fleischli, Summary of Water Quality Concerns Related to Re-
tail Gas Outlets ("RGOs"), (Feb. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, by Santa Monica 
BayKeeper based on documents provided by the California Regional Water Quality 
Control Board, on file with author); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
("MTBE") Prods.Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599-603 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 
252 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
253 See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text. 
254 See, e.g., Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001) (consumer expectation test applied to home pesticides product that caused dis-
ability); Sparks v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739, 746-747 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (consumer expectation test applied to asbestos insulation product that caused 
fatal disease). 
2M See, e.g., Sparks, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-747; Soule v. General Motors Corp., 
882 P.2d 298, 309-310 (Cal. 1994) 
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in petro tort litigation, petroleum defendants' claimed inability 
to design petroleum fuel in a different way would be irrelevant, 
as California "neither requires nor allows proof of the existence 
of a better design under the consumer expectation test. "256 
Whether the analysis regarding the ICE of what is "rea-
sonably safe for its intended use" should include anything other 
than that related to the transportation of people and things on 
roadways is doubtful according to dicta in some legal opin-
ions.257 One court held social realism never extended the scope 
of an automobile manufacturer's duty beyond the highway to a 
problem not exclusively related to vehicular use, such as air 
pollution.258 While this interpretation of "social realism" may 
have changed since that 1972 opinion, applying even this in-
terpretation to the scope of petroleum fuels "intended use" indi-
cates a close connection with air pollution. This seems to be 
supported by the reaction cigarettes go through that falls 
within its intended use: the burning of tobacco as compared to 
the burning of gasoline. The only alteration to petroleum fuel 
occurs when it is being used for its intended use; thus, a con-
sumer reasonably could be said to have an expectation about 
the way fuel burns. 
Alternatively, if a court decides the risk-benefit test is ap-
propriate, the court will weigh such factors as feasibility and 
cost of alternative designs against the inherent risk of harm.259 
As discussed supra, the harms from petro use are arguably sig-
nificant.260 In assessing the feasibility of an alternative design 
the petro plaintiff may be able to adduce evidence that alterna-
tive designs currently exist. A court will judge their availabil-
ity against standards at the time of marketing:61 For past 
damages a petro plaintiff's claim, therefore, may have to focus 
on older feasible technologies, such as electric cars, multi-valve 
engines, and lighter automotive components:62 With current 
availability of hydrogen fuel, the possibility of obtaining some 
256 Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1998). 
257 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. 
TIL 1971). 
258 [d. 
259 Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443, 454-455 (Cal. 1978). 
260 See supra notes 53-100 and the accompanying text. 
261 David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 45-46. 
262 [d. 
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relief against petroleum fuel manufacturers is likely. Certain 
claims against ICE manufacturers that allege they are produc-
ing fuel-inefficient vehicle designs may also be a viable argu-
ment under this test.263 Targeting vehicle engine manufactur-
ers is particularly likely as alternative engine types have been 
around for years."64 Under strict-liability principles, evidence 
that the manufacturers "acted as reasonably prudent manufac-
turers would have under the circumstances will not preclude 
the imposition of liability.,,"GS This is true "if, upon hindsight, 
the trier of fact concludes that the product's design is unsafe to 
consumers, users, or bystanders. m66 
For strict liability, under either test, to prove that a prod-
uct is defective in design it must be shown that the product's 
design is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer."G7 This does 
not mean that all dangerous objects fail this test. Even dan-
gerous products, such as a knife's sharp edge, are not necessar-
ily design defects. 268 One defense the petro industry may raise 
is that since no feasible way exists to burn petroleum products 
without emitting carbon dioxide and harmful toxins, they are 
inherently dangerous features of the product, such as a knife's 
sharp edge, and are therefore excluded from design defect li-
ability:69 An "inherent feature of a product" such as a knife's 
sharp edge, however, is distinguishable from toxic by-products. 
The dangerous design of the knife blade is the function for 
which it was created, and with care it may be used without 
harmful by-products; in the case of petroleum fuel, the harm is 
a side product of the design's functionality and the design of 
the product results in harm despite careful use. 
In petro tort litigation, which defective design test the 
court decides is appropriate would likely have a significant im-
pact on the outcome of the litigation. Under the consumer-
expectation test, the California petro plaintiffs may show evi-
263 Id. 
264 STAFF OFFICE OF TECHNOWGY AsSESSMENT, ADVANCED AUTOMOTIVE 
TEcHNOWGY: VISIONS OF A SUPER-EFFICIENT FAMILY CAR, 104TH CONG., at 64 (1995). 
265 Barker, 573 P.2d 443,453-457. 
,.. Id. 
"JJJ1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
,.. James T. O'Reilly & Nancy C. Cody, The Products Liability Resource Manual, 
7 (General practice Section, American Bar Association 1993)(citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)). 
,.., David Grossman, supra note 120, at 44 (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)). 
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dence of an objective condition of the product, and the fact-
finder may then determine whether the product meets ordinary 
expectations.27o In contrast, under the risk-benefit test, even if 
the product satisfies the consumer's expectations, if the fact-
finder decides on the basis of expert testimony that the product 
contains excessive, preventable danger or its risk outweighs its 
benefit, it still is considered defective.271 Thus, whereas under 
the consumer-expectation test, the factfinder draws the conclu-
sion, under the risk-benefit test the expert must draw the link 
between the unreasonable dangerousness of the product and 
the harm caused.272 Consequently, a defective design claim may 
be successful under strict-liability theory using the consumer-
expectation test but not using the risk-benefit test.273 For ex-
ample, in Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., although the jury 
found the defendant companies liable on a negligent-design 
theory, the court of appeal reversed the judgment.274 It ruled 
that "consumers' safety expectations could be shaped only by 
the package warnings," which federal law governed, and there-
fore competent expert testimony had to fill the causation gap 
between the negligent design and the alleged harm.275 The 
court found the plaintiffs expert witness had failed to establish 
that the asserted design defect of the cigarettes more likely 
than not was a substantial factor causing the lung cancer.276 
Since the case could not be tried on a consumer-expectation 
theory, the jury could not bring their common experience and 
expectations to measure.277 Thus, the plaintiffs assertion that 
smoking in general was the cause of harm was insufficient, 
since no jury speculation (consumer expectation) was allowed.278 
Evidence that the tobacco companies had developed but failed 
to use methods to lower addictive properties of cigarettes, and 
that cigarette smoking and lung cancer have a dose-response 
270 Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305 (Cal. 1995). 
271 Barker, 573 P.2d at 454. 
272 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199 (1982); see also 
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 863-864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
273 See, e.g., Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864 (court dismissed negligence 
claim while stating a strict liability claim based on consumer expectation theory may 
have been successful). 
274 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834. 
276 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864. 
276 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834. 
277 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864. 
278 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 834. 
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relationship, was also found to be insufficient.279 Under the 
risk-benefit test expert testimony must specifically prove the 
defective nature of the product's design.280 
4. Nuisance Cause of Action 
Although California did not use nuisance as a cause of ac-
tion in its tobacco claim, many other states did. 281 At the time, 
applying nuisance in the mass products context had little sup-
port in case law, so the defendants' potential liability may have 
significantly contributed to the industry's unacceptable risk of 
losing, thereby inducing the settlement.282 Since California's 
tobacco litigation, nuisance law has been applied successfully 
in mass product litigation against lead paint, handgun, and 
MTBE manufacturers.283 Nuisance law's application to petro 
litigation may be especially fitting, as for over 900 years com-
mon-law nuisance tort liability has covered offenses involving 
environmental interference with the public health and comfort, 
in particular "widely disseminated bad odors, dust, and 
smoke."284 California codified common-law nuisance liability in 
Civil Code Section 3479: 
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not lim-
ited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent 
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of 
life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or 
use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, 
Z19 Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 863-864. 
280 [d.; Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199 (1982). 
281 Donald Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 741, 747 (2003). 
2S2 [d. at 763-764. 
283 Whitehouse v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226,2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 
April 2, 2001) (court upheld public nuisance claim against lead pigment manufacturers 
and their trade associations); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rep. 
225 (2000) (court held plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a nuisance claim 
against handgun manufacturers); see also In Re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. 
Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12192, (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 2001) (court 
allowed public nuisance claim against oil companies for MTBE); White v. Smith & 
Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000) . 
... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, cmt. b.; Donald G. Gifford, supra 
note 281, at 775. 
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bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, 
street, or highway, is a nuisance.285 
Modern cases liberally construe this section.286 Whether a 
given activity "is a nuisance cannot be determined by any fixed 
general rule. "287 "It depends upon the facts of each particular 
case.'>2SS A court will look at such things as the nature of the 
activity, "the extent and frequency of the injury, the effect upon 
the enjoyment of health and property, and other similar fac-
tors."289 Liability attaches not only to one who intentionally 
creates or maintains a nuisance, but also to one who assists in 
its creation or maintenance.290 Cases hold that it is unfair to 
deny an injured person redress simply because she cannot 
prove how much damage each tortfeasor did, when it is certain 
that among them they did it all:91 
Nuisance law is broken into two fields of tort liability, pri-
vate nuisance and public nuisance.292 An actor's conduct may 
incur liability in either or both.293 A public nuisance is "one 
which affects at the same time an entire community or 
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although 
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individu-
als may be unequal. 7729. In contrast, every nuisance not included 
in the definition of the public nuisance is private:95 Prosser's 
distinction between the two has been followed in California 
28Ii CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (Deering's 2004); see Levine v. City of Los Angeles, 137 
Cal. Rptr. 512, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Section 3479 is declarative of the common 
law); see also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1234 (Cal. 1975) (unless contrary 
intent clearly appears, civil code provisions will be construed to embody common-law 
decisions). 
288 See, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1972); Kornoff v. 
Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 288 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1955); Hulbert v. California etc. Cement 
Co., 118 P. 928 (Cal. 1911); Judson v. L. A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581 (Cal. 1910); 
Woods v. Johns, 50 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). 
"" Shields v. Wondries, 316 P.2d 9, 12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
288 [d. 
289 [d. 
"'" Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr. 
596, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Hardin v. Sin Claire 47 P. 363 (Cal. 1896); 
Shurpin v. Elmhirst, 195 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983». 
291 See Ingram v. City of Gridley, 224 P.2d 798, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (quoting 
Wigmore, Select Cases on the Law of Torts § 153). 
292 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introductory Note to Chapter 40 - Nui-
sance. (ALI 1979). 
293 Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554-555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) . 
... CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3480 (2004) . 
... CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3481 (2004). 
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cases: "a private nuisance is a civil wrong based on a distur-
bance of rights in land," as opposed to a public nuisance, which 
is dependent "on an interference with the rights of the commu-
nity at large. m.. In determining whether something is a public 
nuisance, the focus is on whether an entire neighborhood or 
community, or at least a considerable number of persons, are 
affected, and an act or omission to act interferes with that 
community's interests, comfort, convenience, or health.297 Sec-
tion 821B of the Restatement (Second) defines a public nuisance 
as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public.m98 Thus, under the Restatement (Second), liabil-
ity is precluded specifically, and only, for injuries to individuals 
not exercising a public right, and for reasonable interference 
with such rights.299 
Petroleum pollution at times involves the use of property 
in a way that harms the property interests of others, so a pri-
vate-nuisance claim may be appropriate in some situations. 
More commonly, however, the facts of petro litigation clearly 
involve the public-nuisance criteria of "anything, which is inju-
rious to health" and "the comfortable enjoyment of life or prop-
erty" affecting "at the same time an entire community.'>3°O Fur-
ther, California's public-nuisance statute and the Restatement's 
296 Petroiane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 554-555 (citing Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) at 
p.594). 
297 See Eaton v. Klimm, 18 P.2d 678, 680 (Cal. 1933); Venuto v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 354-355 (Cal. 1971); Biber v. O'Brien 32 P.2d 425, 
427-428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934). 
298 The history of the public-nuisance approach embodied in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, which most states follow, indicates that pollution is at the heart of 
public nuisance liability. David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 53. "Pollution may be 
a crime against God and nature ... by putting in that defmition we make it impossible 
to reach the problem of the black cloud of filth which hangs over my community and, I 
suspect yours." Presentation of Restatement of Law, Second, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 
16, A.L.I. Proc. 287, 291 (remarks of John P. Frank). This statement was made in 
reaction to a proposed version of the Restatement's public nuisance. It reflected the 
sentiment which resulted in the present version of the definition, specifically adopted 
to address the issues of air, water and land pollution. J.H. Baker, American Introduc-
tion to English Legal History, 352 (2d ed. 1979); Janet Loengard, The Assize of Nui-
sance: Origins of American Action at Common Law, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144, 145-49 
(1978). Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 807. 
299 To sustain damages (as opposed to injunctive relieD for a public nuisance, 
however, a private party must also prove special injury, see discussion infra, notes 317-
341. 
"'" Washington. v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (declaring "air 
pollution is, of course, one of the most notorious types of public nuisance in modern 
experience. " 
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definition are general enough to include as the cause of inter-
ference the producing, marketing, and distributing of products. 
The first critical element in any public-nuisance suit, 
which appears to be easily satisfied by petro litigants, is not 
that it affects large numbers of people, but that it invades 
rights that are common to members of the general public. 301 As 
quoted in a recent California case, Section 821B of the Restate-
ment (Second) identifies five "categories of 'public rights,' the 
unreasonable interference with which may constitute a public 
nuisance: the public health, the public safety, the public peace, 
the public comfort or the public convenience."30. Petro litigants 
could assert claims based on interference with each of these 
rights. The enjoyment of the natural environment is probably 
included within the right to public comfort, peace, and health.S03 
The right to be free from injury and disease, from contaminated 
groundwater, and from smog appears to be encompassed within 
all five recognized public rights. so. 
Of course, not every interference with a common public 
right constitutes a public nuisance. Petro litigants seeking to 
press a common-law tort claim for public nuisance must show 
the interference is both substantial and unreasonable:05 Cali-
fornia courts follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) to 
determine what meets this level of interference.806 The re-
quirement of substantiality is formulated as proof of "signifi-
cant harm," defined as a "real and appreciable invasion of the 
plaintiff's interests," one that is "definitely offensive, seriously 
annoying or intolerable. m07 An objective measure is applied: "If 
normal people in that locality would not be substantially an-
301 See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3480 (2004) and CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3479 (2004); see also 
Kenneth A. Manaster & Daniel P. Selmi, California Environmental Law and Land Use 
Practice § 1.01 (1991). 
302 People ex reI. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 604-605 (Cal. 1997) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, subd. (2)(a». 
303 See, e.g., David A. Grossman, supra note 120, at 53; see also Bruce Ledewitz & 
Robert D. Taylor, Law and the Coming Environmental Catastrophe, 21 WM. & MARy 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 599, 614 (1997); and nlinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104-05 
(1972). 
304 See discussion supra Section II. 
"'" People ex rel. Gallo, 929 P.2d at 604-605. 
306 Id. 
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, cmts. c & d; Shields v. Wondries, 
316 P.2d 9, 12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). Prosser, Torts 389; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 822. Prosser, Torts 411 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 
826-31. 
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noyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a 
significant one. m08 The unreasonableness of an interference is a 
judgment taking into account a handful of factors to decide if 
the gravity of harm it inflicts is outweighed by the social utility 
of the situation.309 Once again, objectivity is sought: "The ques-
tion is not whether the particular plaintiff found the invasion 
unreasonable, but 'whether reasonable persons generally, look-
ing at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would 
consider it unreasonable.">310 
Petro defendants may argue that the harm to the public's 
health and environmental pollution caused by use of petroleum 
products would not disturb a normal person, and their prod-
uct's social value outweighs the small amount of harm inflicted. 
As a counterargument, petro plaintiffs could argue that the 
factors in Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
demonstrate that the defendant's conduct reaches a level of 
unreasonable interference. Courts use the three factors de-
scribed in the Section 821B to determine whether a particular 
interference is "unreasonable": 
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference 
with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the 
public comfort or the public convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance 
or administrative regulation, or 
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has pro-
duced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor 
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the 
public right. (emphasis added).311 
Arguably producing, manufacturing, and distributing 
products that, as designed, create smog and other air pollution 
in areas of common public use are significant interferences 
308 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F, com. d. 
309 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826-831; San Diego Gas & Electric Co. 
v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 669, 696-697 (Cal. 1996). 
310 San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 920 P.2d at 696-697 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, com. c). 
311 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B; In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 659, 679 (Cal. App. 2005). 
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with the public health, peace, comfort and safety.312 Since the 
1950s the conduct creating public health harms has occurred 
and it continues at an ever-growing pace, so it probably also 
satisfies the long-lasting effect factor.313 The same conduct is 
responsible for the hole in the ozone layer and climate change, 
which also arguably significantly interfere with the public 
health and public peace.31' The majority of the scientific com-
munity could support the position that both interferences sat-
isfy any definition of long-Iasting.3Is Furthermore, it may be 
possible to argue that death, illness, and a hole in the atmos-
phere so significantly affect the public and that no social value 
could outweigh them, especially as the defendants have the 
capability to sell alternative designs that do not cause these 
harms. Thus, nuisance laws' availability for a suit by petro 
plaintiffs may be particularly apt in the present era, as alter-
native sources are now ready to be used. In sum, if proof of the 
harms caused by the use of petroleum fuel and ICEs satisfies 
California's causation standards, the court might easily find 
the petro defendants' conduct involves interferences both sub-
stantial and unreasonable.316 
The third critical element of a public-nuisance suit against 
the petro industry, for both government entities and private 
citizens, is to establish standing. Abatement of a public nui-
sance was ordinarily the business of the sovereign, acting 
through its law officers.317 A private person now has standing 
to bring a public nuisance if he or she has suffered not only 
special injury, but also damage different in kind-rather than 
in degree-from that shared by the general public.318 A private 
petro plaintiff who sufficiently alleges such special injury can 
seek relief in the form of damages and an injunction.31" 
Supreme Court precedent granting Georgia parens patriae 
standing for an injunction to abate a permanent nuisance from 
312 See discussion supra Section II. 
313 See id. 
31. David Grossman, supra note 120, at 54. 
315 Id. See supra notes 53-100 and accompanying text. 
316 See discussion supra notes 188-228 and accompanying text. 
317 CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 3491, 3494; see California Oregon Power Co. v. Superior 
Court, 291 P.2d 455, 463 (Cal. 1955). 
318 CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 3480, 3493 (2004); Reynolds v. Presidio R. R. Co., 81 P. 
1118-1119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1905); see Prosser on Torts (3d ed.) at pp. 608-609. 
319 Fisher v. Zumwalt, 61 P. 82 (Cal. 1900). 
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noxious gases from copper mines was applied by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in an antitrust claim regarding automobile pollution.320 
The Supreme Court found Georgia had standing to sue for in-
jury to forests, crops, orchards, and other losses, even though 
the majority of the harm occurred to private property.32l The 
Ninth Circuit followed this decision when it found government 
entities and crop farmers had standing to seek an injunction to 
stop an alleged horizontal conspiracy from eliminating compe-
tition in the production of automotive anti-pollution control 
devices.322 Since the original action warranting this type of 
standing was based on Supreme Court precedent set in a public 
nuisance case, the Ninth Circuit's decision suggests this prece-
dent might similarly permit standing in a public-nuisance suit 
regarding automobile pollution. 
Courts have noted that a 1905 amendment to California 
Code of Civil Procedure. Section 731 was purposely adopted to 
empower district attorneys and city attorneys to institute civil 
actions for the abatement of public nuisances in counties and 
cities, and to compel them to do so when directed by the legisla-
tive authorities of counties and cities.323 This bolsters the ar-
gument that California's Attorney General should bring a pub-
lic-nuisance suit against the petro industry. Since a private 
attorney is not allowed to bring a public-nuisance suit in the 
absence of special injury, and the legislature specifically 
granted authority to government entities to bring public-
nuisance suits, public policy indicates that government entities 
should do so if public rights are being infringed.32' Otherwise, 
320 Ga. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907) (Court granted 
state's claim for an injunction, on behalf of mainly private citizen property owners, to 
enjoin defendant copper mines from discharging noxious gases.); In re Multidistrict 
Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973). 
321 Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237-38. 
322 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d at 13l. 
323 Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 164 P. 1119, 1120-1121 (Cal. 1917). CAL. CODE 
CIV. PROC. § 731 states, "An action may be brought by any person whose property is 
injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance ... A civil 
action may be brought in the name of the people of the State of California to abate a 
public nuisance ... by the district attorney of any county in which such nuisance ex-
ists, or by the city attorney of any town or city in which such nuisance exists ... and 
such district attorney, or city attorney, of any county or city in which such nuisance 
exists must bring such action whenever directed by the board of supervisors of such 
county or whenever directed by the legislative authority of such town or city." 
324 See, e.g., People ex reI. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985) 
(holding in a public nuisance abatement action, it was improper, under CAL. CODE elV. 
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areas of bad air pollution would essentially be zones of sacri-
fice. Further, the state's willingness to bring such a suit is in-
dicated by the recent case brought last summer against five 
major power producers for their contribution to global warm-
ing.325 
Private petro plaintiffs must carefully plan and choose 
their plaintiff groups and the type of special injury to have 
standing in a public-nuisance suit. In Diamond, the court 
compared special-injury claims of property and health damage 
caused by petroleum pollution to properly pled special-injury 
claims from the common-law categories of "dust, smoke and 
odors.!!326 The court, however, held the size of the plaintiff class 
(over seven million), the diversity of the interests, and the mul-
tiplicity of the issues would make the proceeding unmanage-
able-essentially the class was so large it arguably was the 
public. 327 Also, while proximity to a nuisance may make some 
plaintiffs suffer greater injury or aggravation of health prob-
lems than those suffered by more remote plaintiffs, a finding of 
injury different in kind is unlikely.32B Allegations of aggravated 
respiratory disorders, general allergies, and allergy to specific 
chemicals have all been found different "in degree," not "in 
kind" from those suffered by the surrounding community.329 
This is largely because the standard for nuisance liability is 
that of a "normal person of ordinary sensibilities in the com-
munity.''S30 Fear due to proximity to jet fuel storage tanks at an 
airport and to pollution from a refinery have also been held not 
to be different in kind from effects on other individuals in the 
community.331 
PROC. § 731, for the action to be brought in the name of a private attorney hired by a 
city to bring the action, instead of bringing the action in the name of the city attorney.). 
32S Eight States File Global Warming Lawsuit Against Polluters, THE DAILY 
RECORD OF ROCHESTER, July 23,2004. 
326 Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 and n.5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1971). (It is assumed from the context of note 5 that when the court wrote "pri-
vate nuisance" it intended to refer to a "private action" in a "public nuisance.") 
327 [d. 
326 Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350,356-357 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1971); Baker v. Burbank-Pasadena Airport Authority, 270 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1970). 
329 Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 356-357. 
330 [d. 
331 Koll-Irvine Center Property Owners Assn. v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1980). 
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A survey of California cases indicates a finding of special 
injury often requires extreme or multiple facts acting concur-
rently to reach some sort of reprehensible conduct.332 For ex-
ample, "trauma resulting from an assault with a gun," gun shot 
wounds, and both "specific and direct physical and emotional 
injuries by the shock to [a person's] nervous system upon" wit-
nessing the shooting have been held sufficient.333 So has the 
death of a two-year old drowned in a hole filled with water in 
an improperly maintained flood channe1.334 In another case, it 
was sufficient that the plaintiffs alleged a multitude of inter-
ferences by the operation of a laundry, such as "noises, odors, 
blocking of sidewalks, soot and grease deposits," and ill 
health.330 Likewise, proximity of some plaintiffs to a source of 
pollution may reach the level of an injury different in kind from 
that suffered by others, if the pollution not only leaves deposits 
on the land of nearby plaintiffs but also deprives them of com-
fortable use and enjoyment of their homes and is deleterious to 
their health; or if smoke, odor, and noise all combine to disturb 
them both in the comfortable enjoyment of their property and 
in their occupations.33G While what amounts to "different in 
kind" clearly is fact-specific, the broadness of the standard, and 
the variety of the harms caused by petroleum pollution, leaves 
a myriad of claims open to the creative petro plaintiff. 
Farmers with children in areas with high amounts of traf-
fic may be an ideal plaintiff group. Children are especially 
vulnerable to health harms caused by petro emissions.337 
Stormwater runoff carries exhaust contaminants into farmers' 
fields. 338 Decreased productivity from local air pollution causes 
diminished crop yields and would constitute injury to commer-
cial interests. If farm families sue for all of these interferences 
with their rights, their combined injuries would likely be suffi-
332 LexisNexis search on December 6, 2004, see summary infra notes 333-336 and 
accompanying text. 
333 Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (2003). 
334 Buchanan v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 128 Cal. Rptr. 770 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1976). 
335 Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. 484, 485-486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927). 
336 Judson v. L.A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581 (Cal. 1910); Lind v. City of San 
Luis Obispo, 42 P. 437 (Cal. 1895). 
337 See supra, Section II. I. 
338 [d. 
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cient for standing to assert a claim of public nuisance. 339 Stand-
ing was found for crop farmers in 1973 under an antitrust stat-
ute, when plaintiff farmers sued automobile manufacturers for 
injury to their crops allegedly caused by a conspiracy to reduce 
motor vehicle air pollution research and to retard the develop-
ment of anti-pollution equipment.34o Some private groups may 
also be able to allege special injury on behalf of their members, 
such as nonprofits like environmental organizations and the 
American Lung Association.341 
a. Public Nuisance Liability in a Mass Products Tort 
This last century of industrial boom not only produced 
products liability, but it also spawned nuisance suits against 
product manufacturers. 34' Interestingly, the first suits includ-
ing nuisance claims against product manufacturers occurred in 
the 1970's against motor vehicle manufacturers.343 In fact, a 
California court issued probably the first published opinion on 
public nuisance against a product manufacturer for claims for 
personal injury and property damage caused by pollution from 
motor vehicles.344 The court stated that the dismissal did not 
bar other "similar class action nuisance claims appropriately 
framed," which implies that a California court may accept some 
form of a nuisance action concerning petro products."'5 Still, 
this implication is untested. 
339 See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
3<0 Id. (In antitrust suit court held farmers satisfied first requisite of standing 
under Clayton Act section 4 for allegation of injury to "business or property" from de-
fendant's conspiracy to eliminate anti-pollution devices.). 
341 See Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se plaintiff, in aver-
ring that his respiratory discomfort will be aggravated by emissions from developments 
on former federal lands, asserts an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particular-
ized to satisfy standing); Soc'y Hill Towers Owners' Ass'n v. Rendell, 210 F.3d 168, 176 
(3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "the Residents have alleged concrete and particularized 
injury in the form of increased traffic, pollution, and noise"); Sierra Club v. EPA, 129 
F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that interest in being free from increased auto 
emissions conferred standing). 
342 See id. 
343 Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972); Diamond v. General 
Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). 
344 Donald Gifford, supra note 281, at 750 (referring to Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 
641) . 
... Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 641-643 and n. 5. It is assumed by context that 
when the court wrote "private nuisance" in footnote 5 it intended to refer to a "private 
action" in a "public nuisance." 
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Nuisance claims truly burst upon the mass products tort 
scene in the tobacco litigation of the 1990s.346 Similar claims 
have subsequently been brought against manufacturers of 
handguns, genetically modified seed corn, methyl-tertiary butyl 
ether (MTBE is a gasoline additive), lead paint, and herbi-
cides. 347 Courts in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois have all held 
manufacturers liable for nuisance related to their products be-
yond the point of sale.s4s Many of the public-nuisance claims 
upheld against product manufacturers have occurred within 
the last five years.34• Some arguments have been made that 
this expansion of nuisance law to product manufacturers is un-
supported by the historical origins of the tort. 350 However, 
based on the prevalence of such suits, the counterargument--
that tort law, and for that matter American jurisprudence, is a 
creature ofhistory--seems to be prevailing. 
Some California cases appear to make product manufac-
turers' liability under nuisance law dependent upon the accom-
paniment of some activity by the manufacturer beyond the 
normal behavior associated with the manufacture, distribution, 
... Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 745-47. 
347 In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(refusing to dismiss nuisance claims against distributor of genetically modified seed 
corn that allegedly "contaminated the entire corn supply of the United States"); In Re 
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prod. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12192, (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 2001) (court allowed public nuisance claim against oil compa-
nies for MTBE); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) 
(court allowed public nuisance claim against firearm manufactures and denied motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action); Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1(111. 
App. Ct. 2001) (court denied motion to dismiss and allowed public nuisance claim 
against rrrearm manufacturers); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson, 2000 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 352 (Mass. Super Ct. filed July 13, 2000) (slip op.) (refusing to dismiss public 
nuisance claims at pleading stage against firearms manufacturers); New York v. Fer-
menta ASC Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (court held that whether 
defendant herbicide manufacturer's product was a public nuisance was a factual ques-
tion); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002) (court 
allowed public nuisance claim against firearm manufacturers and denied motion to 
dismiss for failure to state cause of action); Whitehouse v. Lead Industrial Association, 
2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. 2001) (court held public nuisance claim factually suffi-
ciently alleged against lead pigment manufacturers and their trade associations) . 
... Young v. Bryco Arms, 327 Ill. App. 3d 948 (Ill. App. 1at Dist. 2001); Northridge 
Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 205 Wis. 2d 267 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1996); Page County Appliance 
Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171 (Iowa 1984). 
34. See supra notes 347-348; see also In re Starlink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. 
Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002); White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 
2000); Young v. Bryco Arms, 765 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Johnson v. Arms, 304 F. 
Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. N.Y. 2004); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 
1136 (Ohio 2002). 
,.., Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 775. 
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and supplying of the product.351 This has been held to be satis-
fied, for example, if the defendant manufacturer's equipment is 
designed to discharge waste in a manner that will create a nui-
sance.352 In contrast, this requirement is not satisfied by merely 
putting an allegedly defective product into the stream of com-
merce."53 This subtle difference distinguishes liability for af-
firmative steps like providing specific instructions to an unsus-
pecting user, but not for failure to warn."5' Thus, a petro plain-
tiff may be able to bring a nuisance action against petro prod-
uct manufacturers, but the plaintiff must allege something 
more than that the products had a defect that caused a nui-
sance by entering the stream of commerce:55 Alleging that the 
products were designed to discharge toxins in a manner that 
will create a nuisance may likely be sufficient. 356 Another pos-
sibility is alleging that petro manufacturers purposefully 
dominated the market, creating a system in which other alter-
native sources of transport were unavailable to consumers. 
This creation of a market nuisance theory may be comparable 
to the nuisance actions courts have allowed against gun manu-
facturers, distributors, and dealers, on the theory that in tar-
geting illegal gun purchasers the market they created was a 
public nuisance. 357 
b. Proving Defendant's Exclusive Control 
Whether California nuisance law requires a special rela-
tionship demonstrating defendant's control over the instrument 
SOl lleto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211, fn. 26 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Modesto 
Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court of San Francisco County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
865, 875-876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
302 City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 875-876 (The court 
held a party is liable under common law nuisance for "manufacturing a system de-
signed to dispose of dry cleaning solvent wastes improperly or by instructing users of 
its products to dispose of wastes improperly," but not liable for merely placing "solvents 






307 See, e.g., lleto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003); Gary ex. reI. King v. 
Smith & Wesson, Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 95 Ohio St. 3d 416 (2002); Johnson v. Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D. N.Y. 
2004). 
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causing the nuisance appears uncertain:58 Proximate cause in 
California does not contain a control requirement; the defen-
dant's act or omission simply must be a substantial factor in 
causing the harm.359 This would lead to an analysis similar to 
that undertaken in determining causation.3Bo In the context of 
nuisances, for instance, it has been held that it is not fatal to a 
plaintiff's claim under California law concerning handguns if 
the defendant manufacturer did not control the product at the 
moment the harm occurred.3BI A defendant's "control of the 
creation and supply of an illegal secondary market for fire-
arms" has been held to be a sufficiently substantial factor to 
hold the defendant liable for a person using a gun to shoot 
someone.3B2 One California case recently stated "liability for 
nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, pos-
sesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a posi-
tion to abate the nuisance: the critical question is whether the 
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.'>363 
On the other hand, if a court found California nuisance law 
has a control requirement, factors identified in support of re-
jecting claims on these grounds suggest a petro plaintiff's case 
would still pass muster.3" It has been noted as significant by 
courts denying nuisance claims against asbestos manufactur-
ers that the defendants no longer controlled the asbestos prod-
ucts and thus lacked the legal right to abate the asbestos haz-
ards because "ownership and control lie exclusively with the 
plaintiffs.mB5 However, petro defendants need not remain in 
control of their vehicles or petroleum fuel in order to abate tail-
pipe emissions because they can prospectively redesign their 
products. Furthermore, arguably a special relationship be-
tween the petro defendant and plaintiff exists, as it is foresee-
able upon selling a product the buyer will use it . 
... Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003). 
359 [d. 
360 See discussion supra Section III.B.3.a. 
361 [leta, 349 F.3d at 1213 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 768 
N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002)). 
362 [d. 
363 City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
865,871-872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Newhall Land & Fanning Co. v. Superior 
Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377,381-382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993». 
364 Detroit Bd. of Ed. v. Celotex Corp., 493 N.W.2d 513,522 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992). 
,.. [d. 
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c. Remedies for a Public-Nuisance Claim in California 
All the elements of a common-law public-nuisance action 
could be satisfied by petro plaintiffs, and the law seems well 
suited to accommodate petro litigation. Operation of a business 
in accord with government permission and regulation does not 
justify the continuance of a nuisance.366 The fact that other 
sources of similar discomforts to the plaintiff exist in the com-
munity is no defense to a plaintiffs action for public nuisance.367 
And "the adoption of the most approved appliances and meth-
ods of production [does not] justify the continuance of that 
which, in spite of them, remains a nuisance.'>368 While the stat-
ute of limitations may be pleaded in some cases as a limitation 
on liability, it is not a defense to a continuing nuisance, since 
the character of the nuisance gives rise to successive rights of 
action.369 In the tobacco litigation, state recoupment actions, 
including public-nuisance claims, allowed states to pursue such 
actions because some states are exempt from the statute of 
limitations and in those that are not, alleging a continuing 
harm kept the statute from running.370 
Remedies for actions arising out of a nuisance depend upon 
whether the nuisance is permanent or continuing.371 If a nui-
sance is permanent, then Code of Civil Procedure Section 
338(b) requires the plaintiff to "bring one action for all past, 
present and future damage within the three years after the 
permanent nuisance is erected ... damages are not dependent 
upon any subsequent use of the property but are complete 
when the nuisance comes into existence."37' If, on the other 
hand, the nuisance is continuing, then every repetition of the 
continuing nuisance is a distinct wrong, subject to a new and 
separate limitation period, so the person injured can bring suc-
cessive actions until the nuisance is abated, even if the original 
366 Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. 484, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927). 
367 Judson v. L.A. Suburban Gas Co., 106 P. 581, 582 (Cal. 1910). 
368 [d. at 583. 
369 Blue Bird Laundry Co., 259 P. at 486-487. 
370 Donald G. Gifford, supra note 281, at 788. 
371 Louis C. Klein, Note and Comment: California's Nuisance Laws and Petroleum 
Underground Storage Tank Contamination: Will the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations 
for Construction Defects Change the Playing Field? 17 WID'ITIER L. REV. 107, 125 
(1995). 
372 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 870 (Cal. 
1985). 
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claim is barred;373 however, recovery is limited to actual injury 
suffered within the three years prior to commencement of each 
action and prospective damages are unavailable.3u 
The great weight of California authority has articulated 
the basic distinction between permanent and continuing nui-
sances in broad terms of whether the nuisance can be discon-
tinued, or abated, "at any time."37. The nuisance is continuing if 
it may be discontinued at any time.376 Court of appeal opinions 
have explicitly or implicitly recognized that "[m]ost cases ... 
analyze the condition to determine whether the nUI-
sance/trespass may be discontinued."377 
Modem courts have cited Judge Traynor's opmlOn in a 
1952 case to explain California's rationale behind these distinc-
tions and how courts are to derive these distinctions in cases:378 
[I]t has been recognized that in doubtful cases the plaintiff 
should have an election to treat the nuisance as either per-
manent or not. If the defendant is not privileged to continue 
the nuisance and is able to abate it, he cannot complain if the 
plaintiff elects to bring successive actions as damages accrue 
until abatement takes place. On the other hand, if it appears 
improbable as a practical matter that the nuisance can or will 
be abated, the plaintiff should not be left to the troublesome 
remedy of successive actions.379 
Petro defendant liability would likely not be reduced by the 
fact that courts, presumably mindful of the genesis of perma-
nent nuisance as a practical exception to a preferred rule, have 
maintained a preference for fmding a continuing nuisance.38o 
This both protects the plaintiff from "contingencies" such as 
373 Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-627 (Cal. 1945). 
374 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841-
842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
"5 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 627-628 (Cal. 
1952); Phillips v. Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626-627 (Cal. 1945); Kafka v. Bozio, 218 P. 
753,755-756 (Cal. 1923). 
376 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870; Spaulding, 239 P.2d at 627-628; Kafka, 218 P. at 755-
756; Phillips, 162 P.2d at 626-627. 
377 Spar v. Pacific Bell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 482-483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Mangini, 
281 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (concluding complaint could be amended to meet either rubric). 
378 Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Justice Traynor's opinion in Spaulding, 239 P.2d 625). 
379 Id. 
380 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870 (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 
(1947»; Baker, 705 P.2d at 872; Kafka, 218 P. at 756. 
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unforeseen future injury and the statute of limitations itself 
and encourages abatement of nuisances.3sl Also, the courts 
have consistently adhered to the rule that in a case in which 
the distinction between permanent and continuing nuisance is 
close or doubtful, the plaintiff will be permitted to elect which 
theory to pursue.SS2 A sizable damage award is thus very possi-
ble under petro plaintiffs' claim for petroleum industry liability 
based on public-nuisance theory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
"It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system," 
wrote Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis in 1932, "that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country." It was California that 
demanded clean cars when Washington, D.C., would not. 383 It 
can be California that makes petroleum fuel and ICE manufac-
turers liable for the harm they cause, when others will not. It 
is in fact remarkable that no legal effort has yet focused com-
mon-law tort liability on one of the most pervasive sources of 
pollution on the planet.384 
In particular, alleging petroleum fuel is a defective product 
and a nuisance is novel, yet its exemption in California from 
the CAA and its questionable need in the face of alternative 
fuels such as hydrogen make liability imminent.385 Consumers 
suffer from greedy stereotypes as they buy SUV s to feel safe 
and comfortable, yet fuel-efficient large vehicles are unavail-
able386 The alternative to a petroleum-driven society is a world 
as clean as a smokeless room. The governor of California, Ar-
nold Schwarzenegger, recently converted his Hummer to run 
on hydrogen fuel, demonstrating that the utility and bodies of 
vehicles do not have to change to allow for a more ethical life, 
381 Baker, 705 P.2d at 870 (citing United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 
(1947»; Baker, 705 P.2d at 872; Kafka, 218 P. at 756. 
382 See, e.g., Mangini, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 839; Baker, 705 P.2d at 870. 
383 Carl Pope, States Abhor a Vacuum, SIERRA MAGAZINE, available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierral200407Iways.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) . 
... See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. 
38S See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
386 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
60
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol35/iss3/8
2005] . SMOKE BEFORE OIL 489 
just two key components: ICEs and petroleum fue1. 387 The fea-
sibility of petro tort litigation and its absence in a society suf-
fering so many harms from the use of petro products pose ethi-
cal questions for this era concerning this and future genera-
tions. 
ANGELA LIPANOVICH* 
387 Dan Lienert, Vehicle of the Week: Arnold's Hydrogen Hummer, Forbes.com, 
http://www.forbes.coml2005/01l04/cx_dL0104vow_print.html. (last visited Feb. 1, 
2005) . 
• J.D., Candidate, 2006, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, 
CA; B.S. Biology and B.A. Literature, 2001, University of California at Santa Cruz, CA. 
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